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INTRODUCTION
F ROM MEMBERS of the Olympic shooting team to
hunters, housewives, and business people, thousands
of Americans legally transport firearms on air carriers
every day. Media coverage of airline hijackings by armed
terrorists obscures the fact that legitimate carriage of fire-
arms in checked baggage is an ordinary part of air com-
merce. Numerous articles have been published and cases
decided concerning the fourth amendment rights of sus-
pected hijackers and drug couriers since the initiation of
the screening of persons and carryon baggage in 1973.
Issues concerning the carriage of weapons, searches and
seizures, and air carrier security have been analyzed only
in the context of wrongful conduct. This article analyzes
airport security schemes and fourth amendment rights as
they relate to the transportation of firearms for lawful
purposes.
A comprehensive analysis of the development of the
regulatory schemes for transporting firearms and for
screening passengers and carryon baggage will serve two
purposes. First, it will establish a historical perspective
with which to view rapidly changing procedures for air
carrier security. Second, an evaluation of the character
and evolution of the regulatory scheme will assist in estab-
lishing some minimum guidelines in the new age of de-
regulation. Deregulation has spawned an alarming
number of inadvertent security breaches by passengers
fooled by the disappearance of traditional check-in coun-
ters. One major airline, for example, currently locates its
baggage check-in counters inside the sterile area, x-rays
baggage intended to be checked as well as carryon bag-
gage, and will not transport firearms.' The fourth amend-
ment issues and security issues these procedures raise will
become increasingly decisive as deregulation continues to
revolutionize air transportation.
The analysis begins with an overview of air transporta-
I See infra text accompanying note 24.
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tion of firearms to assess the scope of the problem.2
Complete legislative histories follow concerning the stat-
utes which prohibit boarding an air carrier with a con-
cealed weapon,5 establish an exception for carriage in
inaccessible parts of the aircraft,4 provide for uniform
screening procedures for carryon baggage,5 and prohibit
carriage of loaded firearms.6 The analysis also addresses
actions by Congress to implement civil penalties in lieu of
criminal prosecution for boarding an aircraft with a con-
cealed weapon, and to regulate the screening of baggage
for explosives.7 Judicial construction of these provisions
and of the fourth amendment issues they raise will be ana-
lyzed.8 Next, development of Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) regulations on the subject will be assessed. 9
The restrictions imposed under the Gun Control Act of
1968, and the recent relaxation of restrictions under the
Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986 will be consid-
ered. 10 Finally, the article concludes with a look at
whether the fourth amendment can survive future tech-
nologies in firearms and screening."
I. FIREARMS AND AIR CARRIER SECURITY IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM AND DEREGULATION
As dramatic terrorist attacks on air carriers abroad esca-
late in frequency and intensity, the lawful transportation
of firearms in checked baggage quietly continues in the
United States and on international flights. The transport
of firearms in checked baggage has not been restricted or
even questioned, simply because it poses relatively little
risk of harm. However, deregulation has had a severe im-
2 See infra notes 11-28 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 30-58 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 59-76 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 91-115 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 116-293 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 294-339 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 340-4 10 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 411-427 and accompanying text.
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pact on such transport and, more significantly, on the
fourth amendment.' 2
The FAA has taken several measures to tighten air car-
rier security. Federal Air Marshals now travel on certain
high risk flights.' 3 Special security coordinators monitor
screening, access to airplanes, baggage and cargo accept-
ance, and boarding.' 4 Other measures include elimina-
tion of curbside baggage check-in for international flights,
a rule that only ticketed passengers may check baggage, a
one-day hold on unscreened cargo, and physical inspec-
tion of carryon baggage after it has been x-rayed.' 5
No further restrictions have been imposed on transpor-
tation of firearms because such transportation does not
factor into the hijacking threat. The techniques used by
terrorists to smuggle weapons onto aircraft simply have
no relation to the lawful transport of firearms in checked
baggage. Far from discouraging such transport, the
United States government each year distributes rifled
arms to thousands of civilians and pays their fare to the
National Matches and other target and sportshooting
competitions. ' 6
The airlines keep no statistics on the number of passen-
gers who declare and transport firearms. In 1979, after
the FAA first prohibited firearms in the sterile area (i.e.,
past the x-ray checkpoint), the FAA investigated almost
seven hundred violations of the new rule. Violators inves-
tigated were 52% male and 48% female; 59% percent
12 See infra notes 117-293 and accompanying text.
is See 14 C.F.R. § 108.14 (1986).
14 See 50 Fed. Reg. 28,892 (1985) (background to amendments codified at 14
C.F.R. § 108 (1986)).
1- Washington Post, July 11, 1985, at A18, col. 1; Washington Post, June 26,
1985, at A18, col. 1.
- This is done through the United States Division of Civilian Marksmanship. 10
U.S.C. §§ 4307-13 (1982). Section 4311 of the United States Code authorizes the
Secretary of the Army to issue .22 and .30 caliber military rifles and ammunition
to qualified individuals for use at rifle ranges established pursuant to section
4309. Id. at § § 4309, 4311. A federal regulation promulgated under these stat-
utes authorizes participants in the Civilian Marksmanship sponsored programs to
carry issued firearms while traveling. 32 C.F.R. § 544.12(k) (1985).
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were ticketed passengers, and 39% were nonpas-
sengers.' 7 Although the violations did not involve fire-
arms carried in checked baggage, it could be surmised
that roughly half of those who transport firearms by air
are male and half are female.
Twice each year the FAA reports statistics to Congress
concerning firearms discovered on the persons or in the
carryon baggage of passengers.' 8 As a recent report indi-
cates, "airline passenger screening procedures which in-
clude 100 percent inspection of all passengers and their
carryon items were initiated in 1973."' 9 In the first half of
1984 "[x]-ray inspection accounted for 1,265 (95 percent)
of the firearms detected .... The total firearms detected
is 9 percent higher than the average ... detected during
the preceding 8 reporting periods .... "20 The report
states that almost 5.5 billion passengers and almost seven
billion pieces of "carry-on items" were inspected during
1973-84.21 In that period, over 30,000 firearms were de-
tected, resulting in more than 12,000 related arrests. 2
The number of weapons detected remained fairly con-
stant through 1980, but a progressive increase began that
year, coinciding with airline deregulation. 3
Much of the increase can be attributed to incidents that
involved firearms in baggage intended to be checked and
not in carryon baggage, making the FAA statistics unin-
tentionally misleading. Many passengers who attempt to
transport firearms legally become part of the statistics
simply because they lack familiarity with new check-in
procedures adopted by some airlines after deregulation
17 FAA, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIVIL
AVIATION PROGRAM 10 (July-Dec. 1979).
See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1356 (1982).
FAA, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIVIL
AVIATION PROGRAM 3 (Jan. -June 1984).
21" Id. at 3-4.
' Id. at Exhibit 6.
22 Id.
2-. See id. at Exhibit 7. The number of weapons detected rose from 1,020 in July
through December of 1980, to 1,286 in January through June of 1982. Id.
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began. The detected firearms frequently turn up in lug-
gage far too large to be carryon.
The passenger confusion problem has been particularly
acute for one major airline, People Express, because that
airline locates its baggage check-in inside the sterile area
and screens all baggage. FAA data from 1983-84 shows
that at those airports where this airline had departure
flights, its passengers accounted for 64% of all airline pas-
sengers alleged to have entered the sterile area with fire-
arms. 24 Passenger responses to FAA investigatory letters
and FAA letters closing the investigations demonstrate
that the passengers were confused by the unusual screen-
ing procedure and were seeking to transport the firearms
pursuant to established FAA guidelines.25
The fourth amendment concerns and security implica-
tions of x-raying and introducing all baggage into the
sterile area go far beyond the firearms issue. For instance,
a screening activities report for the Melbourne, Florida
airport in 1984 reveals the following:
Dangerous and Unauthorized Items Detected2 6
Provincetown
Boston
Delta Eastern Airline People Express
Bludgeons 12 38 2 645
Firearms 0 0 1 36
Knives 52 128 7 3,031
Toy Weapons 9 16 0 585
Authorities confiscated about half of the above items.2 7
24 A statistical summary and pertinent FAA records prepared pursuant to Free-
dom of Information Act requests are included in the comment of Stephen P. Hal-
brook concerning Docket No. 24171, a Petition for Rulemaking, and are available
for public inspection at the FAA Rules Docket Room, Washington, D.C.
'- See id. for sample letters.
21; American Civil Liberties Union Amicus Curiae Brief at Appendix, Ruiz v.
People Express Airlines, Inc., 802 F.2d 1508 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed,
Jan. 1987. The "bludgeons" referred to apparently would include golf clubs and
other sporting equipment as well as items such as billy clubs.
27 See id.
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The data shows that only a few dozen passengers of air-
lines with normal check-in procedures were subject to a
search and brief detention. Over four thousand passen-
gers of People Express, the airline that does not allow
baggage check-in before x-ray screening, were subject to
physical search and detention. Half of these passengers
had property confiscated. 28 Besides the effect on passen-
gers, the security concerns of bringing non-carryon bag-
gage into the sterile area are obvious from this data.
The following analysis tests the extent to which this
product of deregulation comports with the overall regula-
tory scheme and the fourth amendment. More broadly,
this analysis brings together for the first time the legisla-
tive history and jurisprudence of the delicate balance be-
tween transportation of firearms, privacy rights, and air
carrier security.
II. FIREARMS CARRIAGE AND BAGGAGE SCREENING: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. The Prohibition on Boarding an Air Carrier with a
Concealed Weapon
In 1961, for the first time in aviation history, Congress
enacted legislation to prohibit carriage of an accessible
concealed weapon aboard an aircraft.2 9 Also for the first
time, the suggestion surfaced that passengers and carryon
baggage should be searched for weapons.
In the Senate hearings, discussion centered on fourth
amendment problems with detecting concealed weapons
and the legitimate need to transport firearms in checked
baggage. One proposed bill would have required passen-
gers to submit their persons to a search for concealed
weapons by air carriers. s° Senator Engle, who introduced
28 See id.
21 See Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197 (amending section 902 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958) (current version at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472 (1982)).
so Crimes Aboard Aircraft In Air Commerce, 1961: Hearings on S. 2268, S. 2370, S.
2373, and S. 2374 Before the Aviation Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. On Commerce, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).
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the original bill on crimes aboard aircraft (which eventu-
ally passed), argued that "digging through people's lug-
gage and 'shaking them down' with reference to trying to
find concealed weapons gets pretty close to the limit." 3 1
Captain John Carroll of the Air Line Pilot's Association
testified extensively on the subject of firearms.3 2 He ar-
gued that the word "concealed" should be deleted from
the proposed prohibition and that openly carried weap-
ons should be kept out of the passenger cabin as well. 3
Senator Engle's response shows how widespread the car-
riage of firearms was at that time and how airlines handled
such carriage:
The duck hunters in my country, and the pheasant
hunters, and the deer hunters, ride the specific airline, the
one where the shooting occurred in Chicago recently [in-
volving an extradited prisoner's seizure of a law officer's
firearm] all the time. When they board an airplane you
would think they had a guerrilla squadron of some sort
with all the guns they are carrying to go shoot pheasants,
duck, or deer in northern California.
I can imagine the roar that would come out of the sport-
' Id. at 46.
32 Id. at 49-56.
Id. at 50. Mr. Carroll continued,
At that same time we also urged the adoption of a Federal regula-
tion that would make it illegal for any but authorized persons to
carry firearms or dangerous weapons of any sort into the passenger
cabin. We believed then and we believe now that firearms or other
dangerous weapons, regardless of type, should be carried only in the
baggage compartments. This specifically includes hunting rifles,
shotguns, and other so-called sporting arms that are ordinarily car-
ried in cases as part of a passenger's hand baggage.
To bar the carrying of concealed weapons is not enough. Anyone
bent upon forceably taking over an aircraft can accomplish his pur-
pose just as easily with a sporting rifle or shotgun as he can with a
pistol.
In short, we feel that the only complete answer is to keep all lethal
weapons out of the passenger cabin. However, it appears impracti-
cal to search every passenger who boards an airliner anywhere in the
United States. Therefore, we feel one logical step is to provide a
maximum deterrent by passing and enforcing rigid Federal laws
which provide grave penalties.
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ing people of this country if we tell them they can't take a
gun on an airplane.
But it seems to me that the last time I tried to take a gun
on an airplane I notified the company that I had a gun,
and they told me I had to break it down or take the bolt
out of it. Some shotguns you can break down, as you
know. You can take them apart, and they cannot be fired.
Others can't be broken down, such as automatics. And the
automatics themselves can't be broken down.34
Senator Engle went on to inquire whether the FAA al-
ready had power to require firearms safety measures on
aircraft. Mr. Carroll replied,
I believe as of the day before yesterday the FAA passed
a special regulation which dealt with the carrying of con-
cealed weapons .... These sportsmen on the Pacific air-
lines might very well be able to check their case equipment
with the hostess, put it in the coat department, and in
other cases they may lend themselves to the baggage
compartment.
In addition to the pheasant hunters in California, there
is extensive travel in Alaska, to which there is substantial
transportation of arms. These are frequently in smaller
aircraft.
Our proposal.., would not preclude arrangements be-
ing made with the airline to handle these guns in a way
that was deemed safe by the airline and the captain of the
airplane.3 5
Senator Engle then pressed his position on the issue of
whether or not the second amendment of the United
-1 Id. at 51-52.
" Id. at 52. Mr. Carroll continued,
As you understand, Senator, one of the best ways now for someone
to take over one of these airplanes is simply to buy himself a hunting
outfit and have this unloaded rifle in the case and a package of small
arms ammunition for personal use when packed in the original pack-
age....
As of the day before yesterday, I believe that the FAA regulations
prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons, but does not do any-
thing about this sporting equipment.
[52
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States Constitution guarantees the right to transport arms
and to carry arms openly. He stated,
You know that the Constitution of the United States
guarantees to every American citizen the right to bear
arms. There isn't anything on earth to keep me from get-
ting out my 30.06 and walking right down Pennsylvania
Avenue that I know of, because the Constitution of the
United States says that American citizens shall have the
right to bear arms.
We can prohibit concealed weapons, and the law does
prohibit them. But I am just not so sure that we cannot go
too far with this.
I think it is proper for the CAB or the FAA to require
that guns be broken down where they can be. Guns
should always be unloaded and separated from their am-
munition, and guns should be carried in the baggage com-
partment and not with the passenger. 6
Senate debate on the bill centered on the clarification of
terms and, to a limited extent, objections to the lack of
definition of certain terms. The greatest concern was that
the bill not interfere with the transportation of firearms
for lawful purposes. Senator Case of South Dakota began
the debate with the following:
The language is not objectionable, but for the purpose
3G6 Id. When Mr. Carroll reiterated his opinion that the prohibition should not
be restricted to "concealed" weapons, Senator Engle replied,
I would prefer not to put detailed regulations of this character in this
bill which is general in character, and where it is not necessary to
enact a law because the matter can be handled by regulation.
I am sure FAA and Mr. [FAA Administor Najeeb] Halaby are just
as interested in making everything as safe as it can be, and nothing
would embarrass them more than to have a hunter show up with a
shotgun in his hand and taking over one of their airlines, where they
could have prevented it by requiring him to keep his gun in a case,
separate his ammunition, [and] unload the gun. My recollection is
that a passenger supervisor inspected my rifle when I carried it the
last time on an airline to be sure that it was unloaded. And I want to
be just as sure as he was, too. Nevertheless, I noted that they
watched that matter with considerable care. Not that they expected
me to shoot anybody, but sometimes the guns go off when they
don't want them to.
Id. at 53.
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of legislative history I should like to ask a question. Some
of my colleagues on the floor have come to South Dakota
and have brought with them deadly weapons to be used to
shoot pheasants. I want them to be welcome to come to
South Dakota to shoot pheasants. I believe the language
in the bill is broad enough to cover the taking of weapons
aboard aircraft if they are to be used for the purpose I
have indicated. I would like to have the Senator from Cali-
fornia, as the author of this bill, state what his interpreta-
tion is.
Mr. Engle. We went into that very carefully. The sec-
tion applies to concealed weapons. In the State of Califor-
nia, as in the State of South Dakota and in other States,
airplanes, such as Pacific Airlines, take deer hunters and
duck hunters and pheasant hunters to various places in the
State for hunting purposes. We have no intention of stop-
ping that kind of transportation of weapons. Of course
there are rules and regulations in connection with putting
firearms on airplanes. For instance, they have to be car-
ried in the baggage compartment, and the ammunition
must be kept separate, and the weapons must be un-
loaded, of course. Those are current regulations. But this
section applies only when one has a concealed weapon. It
does not apply to the duck hunter, the pheasant hunter,
the deer hunter who in carrying his rifle complies with the
usual regulations-and it is so intended.
Mr. Case of South Dakota. The first part of the descrip-
tion of the weapons provision I think is perfectly clear on
that. The question might arise in the clause which reads
''or attempts to board such an aircraft carrying such a
weapon." But I understand the author of the bill now to
say that that carrying of such a weapon means carrying a
concealed weapon, and would not affect weapons which
are carried aboard aircraft openly and which are properly
broken down or properly encased and delivered to the
people in charge of the aircraft, placed in their custody.
Mr. Engle. The Senator is correct. 37
At that point the bill provided for a maximum punishment
.17 107 CONG. REC. 15,243-44 (1961).
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of imprisonment of five years and a $5,000.00 fine.38 Sen-
ator Carroll supported a misdemeanor penalty and then
objected to the lack of a definition for "concealed
weapon": "We seek to stop a person who is carrying a gun
from boarding a plane. The Senator from California is an
able lawyer and a former prosecutor. I ask him: What is a
concealed weapon? A knife with a 3-inch blade?" 39 The
following exchange then occurred:
Mr. Engle. We assume that the general definition of
"concealed weapon" would apply. We are not proposing
anything special in the bill.
Mr. Carroll. Weapons concealed where, and by whom?
Where in the bill is the Federal concealed weapons stat-
ute? We know what the definition of "concealed weap-
ons" is at common law and in the States.40
Senator Carroll actually oversimplified the matter, be-
cause carrying concealed weapons was not an offense at
common law.4 ' Moreover, many states list specific weap-
ons which may not be carried concealed.4 2 As Senator
Carroll stated,
Will not the Senator from California agree that each State
might have a different concept of "concealed weapons" in
its statutes? There are all kinds of judicial definitions of
"concealed weapons". . . . We seek to reach a person who
carries a loaded gun onto a plane.... I commend the able
Senator from California, who said yesterday that this item
had reference to concealment rather than to the guns of
some duck hunters or pheasant hunters who were flying
on a commercial plane.... However, I believe there must
be some refinement of the language.43
I" ld. at 15,427.
mi Id.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., State v. Huntley, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 284 (1843).
42 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020(a) (West 1982) (prohibiting carriage of
sandbags, metal knuckles, firearms, and other specified weapons); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 24-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (outlawing concealed pistols, revolvers, and
other firearms).
4 107 CONG. REC. at 15,427. Carroll repeated, "I do call attention to the fact
that there should be an explanatory statement in the Record about the meaning of
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The remarks came to no avail and the bill passed the Sen-
ate. As will be seen, some passengers carrying pock-
etknives have been ensnared by this lack of definition."
Shortly before the House hearings on its antihijacking
bills, the FAA issued an emergency regulation which pro-
vided that "no person, while a passenger aboard an air-
craft being operated by an air carrier in air transportation,
shall carry on or about his person a concealed deadly or
dangerous weapon."'45 After FAA Deputy Administrator
James T. Pyle inserted the regulation into the hearing rec-
ord, Committee Chairman John Bell Williams asked,
Would that cover the carrying of a firearm aboard an
aircraft in a suitcase? The baggage compartment?
Mr. Pyle. No, it would not sir.
Mr. [Daggett H.] Howard [FAA General Counsel]. The
answer to that Mr. Chairman, is "No," and this was done
with intent, the purpose being to keep the enplaning pas-
senger from his firearm, so to speak, but not prevent him
from bringing hunting weapons or other weapons aboard
the aircraft.
Mr. Williams. It would cover the situation where a per-
son might have a gun in a briefcase aboard the aircraft?
Mr. Howard. The wording is "carry on or about his per-
son," as well defined by the law, and would cover the
ready access problem you are speaking of. 4 6
Much of the discussion in the hearings centered on pen-
alty provisions and what kind of intent would be required
to commit a violation. Certain crimes during flight car-
ried a possible punishment of twenty years or $10,000,
while carrying a concealed weapon was punishable by a
maximum of one year or $1,000. 4 7 Congressman Peter H.
a concealed weapon, and whether it means any knife, or a knife with a 3-inch
blade, or what the extent of the blade must be. I think there ought to be some
clarification of the meaning." Id. at 15,430.
44 See infra notes 181-188 and accompanying text.
4. Special Civil Regulation, 26 Fed. Reg. 7009 (1961).
46 Crimes on Board Aircraft, 1961: Hearings on H.R. 8370 Before a Subcomm. of the
House of Representatives Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 27-28 (1961).
47 See id. at 2-4.
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Dominick explained,
We did put in the lower penalty on the carrying of the con-
cealed weapons on the basis that what we are doing here is
referring to someone who is simply carrying a weapon on
him and not necessarily threatening to use it. With the
number of people that you have in the United States who
are going on trips, [of] one sort or another, and many
times carry sidearms with them, for no purpose as far as
the plane is concerned, but simply to use when they get to
their destination for shooting of some kind, either target
practice or actual small game shooting, this is made minor
compared to the other penalties.
It is my own feeling that that section should be modified
in order to put in "intent," which is not in there at this
48point.
Congressmen Dominick, Koffsky, and Williams en-
48 Id. at 9. At a later point, Congressman Dominick asked, "Do you not think
we should have an element of intent to do some harm with the concealed weapon
in order to make it a crime for which you get shoved in the jug for a year?" Id. at
44. To this FAA General Counsel Howard responded,
The availability of a weapon on or about a person, even innocently,
if it is known to a person who may have evil intentions toward the
aircraft, could be dangerous. He could take the weapon from the
other person and use it for his ends. That was why we did not want
to get into the question of whether the person who took it aboard
was the person with the evil intent. It was felt that just having the
weapon around and accessible to people, especially anyone who is
mentally deranged or under the influence of alcohol, could be a
source of trouble, just having it in the cabin.
Mr. Dominick. I want to say that I do not agree with you, Mr.
Howard, because I think that your only possibility of getting any-
body put in jail or fined on this basis [is) if they have a wrongful
intent. This is part of our whole criminal code and if they do not
have any wrongful intent, I do not think that you should be entitled,
or would be entitled to put them in jail or fine them.
Mr. Howard. If I may say so, the carrying of a concealed weapon
is a crime, which it is in most States, and does not have any-
Mr. Dominick. It is in certain States.
Mr. Howard. Well, in certain States. It does not carry with it an
intention of evildoing with the weapon. The mere carrying of it as a
concealed weapon is a crime in some States, a number of States.
Mr. Dominick. In some States.
Mr. Williams. That I believe has been upheld by the Supreme
Court.
Id. at 44-45.
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gaged in lengthy discussion of intent, willfulness, and
punishment under the bill. Would carrying a concealed
weapon with intent to do harm be punished, or only in-
tentionally carrying a concealed weapon? The complete
text of that dialogue, which clarifies congressional intent
on many issues with which the courts would later grapple,
follows:
Mr. Dominick. Although I wrote the bill on the recom-
mendation of the FAA, I would have some concern about
that subsection because it does not have anything to do
with intent. I expressed this yesterday. Would there be
any opposition by the Justice Department to requiring an
element of intent before he was subjected to penalty for
simply carrying on board a weapon of some kind?
Mr. Koffsky. First, (j) is punishable as a misdemeanor.
It is not of the category of a felony. It is classified not
more than 1 year and a thousand dollars.
Mr. Williams. The Senate bill provided not more than
$5,000 or more than 5 years.
Mr. Koffsky. I would rather address myself to Mr.
Dominick's bill on that.
Since it is 1 year and less than a thousand, it is not quite
the category of a crime that requires intent. How would
we prove intent?
In this particular type of crime if we put intent in I
would be troubled by that. Somebody sees that some-
body, that a passenger has a gun and tries to board the
airplane. The intent I guess would be intent to do some
bodily harm aboard the aircraft or do something to lessen
the safety aboard the airplane. If that is the intent, we
would have to prove under that it would be an impossible
task. All we have is a man with a gun.
Mr. Dominick. This is exactly the point I am making. If
all you have is a man with a gun, why should you put him
in the "jug" for a year?
Mr. Koffsky. If you put anything more on it, that you
can only put him in jail if he has certain intent to do some
bad thing aboard the ship, we cannot prove that at that
point.
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Mr. Dominick. You prove intent all the time.
Mr. Koffsky. Yes, we do.
Mr. Dominick. An overt act, and it seems to me that
perhaps the bill as drawn does not take into consideration
many of the things that happen at least in the Western
States, where a fellow is going to go on a geological expe-
dition or a uranium hunt or into the mountains or do any-
thing of this kind where he simply carries along a briefcase
and a gun in the briefcase he has taken from home and
gets out of the airplane and changes into his old clothes
and he is ready to go.
He does not even have a suitcase with him on many oc-
casions. I strongly suspect that this particular type of bill
here would be at least extremely inconvenient so far as a
lot of people who are doing this type of work in the West.
Mr. Koffsky. I would assume that the airlines could post
a notice that they have the facilities for checking it and
bring it to the attention of the passenger that he is just not
allowed to have a gun aboard that airplane. That certainly
would give the passenger enough knowledge of what is
forbidden. Then I would have no trouble with the "not
more than a year."
Mr. Dominick. Suppose this were amended in accord-
ance with the Senate bill where it becomes a felony and
you have 5 years?
Mr. Koffsky. I would have considerably more difficulty
in saying that no intent is necessary.
Mr. Williams. With respect to what the gentleman
asked about, the term "willfully," is that used in here?
Mr. Dominick. It is not.
Mr. Williams. However, if a person declared his gun
would that take it out of the category of being a concealed
weapon?
Mr. Koffsky. I don't know. It could very well because he
no longer is concealing the weapon.4"
The above discussion was limited to guns, but Con-
gressman Williams pointed out that the bill referred "not
to guns, but a deadly or dangerous weapon. Now a dan-
4' Id. at 55-56.
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gerous or deadly weapon, does that have a statutory defi-
nition? ' 5 0 The following remarks ensued:
Mr. Koffsky. It does not under Federal law.
Mr. Williams. If a man on board an aircraft had a
switchblade knife, that of course could be a dangerous
weapon. As a matter of fact, a penknife could be a danger-
ous weapon. In trying to wrestle with this legislation I can
see any number of problems that the committee is con-
fronted with .... What constitutes a dangerous weapon?
Mr. Koffsky. Perhaps we could leave that to a judge to
decide the context.
Mr. Williams. If a person boards an aircraft with a foun-
tain pen tear gas dispenser and while that would not be
considered a dangerous weapon on the ground possibly in
flight it would most certainly be a dangerous weapon. In
the drafting of this legislation I am inclined to feel we
should try to eliminate as many points of law that would
be raised as possible. 5'
Despite this perceived need to define "weapon," the
committee failed to do so, and reported the above without
change. However, discussion concerning passenger
screening suggests that ordinary pocket knives were not
considered deadly and dangerous weapons. Congress-
man Frank Chelf proposed that passengers should be re-
quired to pass through a metal detector "which would
reveal any steel, iron, or other metal on the body of a pas-
senger. If the detector showed a strong impression, indi-
cating the location of a greater amount of metal than
ordinarily carried in a pocket knife or pocket change -
such person should be searched, then and there. 52
House debates centered on the meaning of "on or
about his person." Congressmen wanted to make it quite
clear in the legislative record that the bill would not inter-
" Id. at 56.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 11. However, FAA's James Pyle noted that metal detectors "are rather
difficult to contol. They will show a belt buckle, a tie clip, or a penknife, and this
would mean that in effect you would be searching every passenger." Id. at 30.
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fere with transportation of firearms in checked baggage.
Congressman Gross of Iowa first raised the subject:
Mr. Gross. I am not opposed to this legislation, but
suppose I wanted to go duck hunting in Florida or Ala-
bama and wanted to take a shotgun aboard a plane. Am I
permitted to do so under this legislation?
Mr. Harris. Yes. The gentleman would not be inter-
fered with at all if he is going duck hunting in Florida and
carries a gun for that purpose.
Mr. Gross. Would that apply to any other citizen?
Mr. Harris. The gentleman would not be singled out.
Mr. Gross.... What provision is there in the bill to the
exception for firearms used for hunting, or is the excep-
tion already in the law?
Mr. Harris. The provision in the bill does not make the
exception, but the provision of the bill is clear as to what is
intended. It does not intend to reach legitimate traveling,
as the gentleman inquires about.53
In a clause-by-clause explanation, Committee Chairman
Williams read from the committee report,
It is intended that a person shall be considered to have a
weapon "about his person" if the weapon is in a bag or
other container which he is holding or which will be read-
ily accessible to him while he is on the aircraft. However,
if the weapon is in a piece of luggage stored at a place on
the aircraft so located that he will not have access to it dur-
ing the flight, it is not to be deemed to be "about his
person." 54
Congressman Harvey of Indiana asked "whether a per-
son who might be taking some of his hunting equipment
on a trip or something of that sort might be charged with
having been guilty by reason of the fact that he had some
guns with him aboard the plane? ' 55 Again, Chairman
Williams responded,
• 107 CONG. REC. 16,546 (1961).
Id. at 16,548. See also H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in
1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2563, 2575.
.N 107 CONG. REC. 16,550 (1961).
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The committee gave considerable consideration to the
question of whether or not this applied to a person who
might have a gun in his suitcase which was checked on the
aircraft in the baggage compartment. The language of the
bill provides that he must have it "on or about his person"
and it must be concealed. Now, "on or about his person,"
as we interpret that language and as we intend to apply it,
would cover a person who had a weapon either on his im-
mediate person or in a carry-on bag or briefcase.
Mr. Harvey of Indiana. I assumed that this contingency
had been foreseen by the committee, but I have also had
some experience in seeing how what we thought was a
very properly worded provision, can be perverted; and I
thought it was a good idea to bring it out in this colloquy
to make sure there is no mistake about it in connection
with this bill.56
Congressman Devine noted that state laws clearly de-
fine the terms used in the bill and linked the right to
transport firearms with the right to bear arms:
Mr. Speaker, in the matter of carrying arms on air-
planes, many people wonder sometimes what a hunter
may do, or perhaps a man who shoots in contests, but so
long as the arms are not concealed on his person or in his
carry-on luggage where he has easy access to them, they
can be shipped.
The Constitution guarantees the citizen the right to
bear arms. This is recognized in various States, but they
must not be concealed. For instance, in my particular ju-
risdiction a man may drive a car with a gun on the seat
beside him and be within the law, but if he hides it under
the seat, puts it in the glove compartment, or in his
pocket, he is guilty of a violation of the Concealed Weap-
ons Act.
He could not carry a concealed weapon aboard a plane
and be within the law, but if it was checked in the baggage
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The only other issue raised concerned the meaning of
the term "deadly or dangerous weapon." In contrast to
the extended but unsuccessful Senate effort to define the
term, the House discussed the term only once without fur-
ther comment. Reading from the committee report,
Chairman Williams explained that the term meant the
same as when used in the provision concerning threaten-
ing or assaulting airline crew members with a weapon,
about which he said,
Consideration was given to attempting to define the
term "deadly or dangerous weapon." However, this is not
practicable. These terms have been used without defini-
tion in other provisions of title 18, United States Code,
and in many State criminal laws. The courts will determine
in each case, as it arises, whether the weapon in question
was deadly or dangerous. 58
The advent of the age of airline hijackings committed
by a handful of desperate or deranged persons against a
minuscule number of passengers forced Congress to en-
act legislation which would affect millions of passengers.
In doing so, Congress balanced the protection of poten-
tial hijacking victims against the rights of the large
number of passengers who transport firearms for lawful
purposes, by prohibiting the transportation of firearms
concealed about the person which would be accessible in
flight.
B. The 1974 Legislation: The Sportsman's Exemption and
Uniform Screening Procedures
1. The Antihiacking Act
In 1969 and 1970, legislators introduced bills to require
x-ray screening of carryon baggage and to change the sta-
tus of the prohibition against boarding with a concealed
weapon from misdemeanor to felony.59 In a hearing
58 Id. at 16,547-48; H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1961
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2563, 2575.
59 See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
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before a House Committee, Congressman John Dingell
insisted that Congress should enact an explicit exception
for firearms in checked baggage, but Assistant Attorney
General Will R. Wilson and Congressman Donald G.
Brotzman contended that such an exception was
unnecessary:
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Wilson, you have been discussing here
the problem that you have with the carrying on of the fire-
arms and the provisions of the existing laws. As a sports-
man, I am somewhat troubled about this.
For example, I know there are a large number of
hunters from your own country in Texas who would go
hunting in Wyoming or Colorado. If under the plain read-
ing of this statute they carry their pet deer or elk or moose
rifle on that aircraft, they are subject to a criminal prosecu-
tion. If the new legislation goes through, they would be
charged with the commission of a felony.
What consideration would you afford under these par-
ticular statutes to the sportsmen of this Nation, innocent,
law-abiding citizens who are probably more anxious to
avoid criminal use of firearms than anybody in our society,
yet they are afflicted with the fact of carrying a case with a
rifle on an aircraft or a shotgun going to a trap shoot or
registered trap shoot may constitute a felony? Their inno-
cent actions may charge them with a felony or misde-
meanor. You have a very large net here with fine mesh
and I want to know how these innocent fish are going to
get caught or swim around it.
Mr. Wilson. I am a deer hunter, and I have gone
through the process of getting a rifle onto a plane a
number of times. First, when you buy your ticket, you tell
them that you are taking it, and then the stewardess takes
it away from you and puts it somewhere. Then you get it
back when you are ready to get off. They have an estab-
lished process for that.
Mr. Dingell. The statute, as I read it-and you are a
lawyer of some experience-does not make any exception
to that....
Mr. Wilson. That is a concealed weapon. The prohibi-
tion is against a concealed weapon ....
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Mr. Brotzman. I just wanted to point out it says "con-
cealed, deadly or dangerous weapon." I think that is the
difference from on your person.60
Further hearings held in 1973 culminated in new com-
prehensive legislation a year later.61 Confusion over
whether a firearm was not concealed if declared was ex-
pressed in the first House hearing on the reform
legislation:
The Chairman. I am glad you differentiated on weap-
ons; you used the word concealed weapons. Out in my
country, people take airlines to go hunting sometimes and
their weapons are not concealed, they just have them in a
bag there. Tell them I have got a shotgun in there, I am
going to hunt ducks, and that is not included in this at all;
is it?
Senator Cannon. Yes; it is.
The Chairman. Is it included? They can't get aboard
with shells? There was two guys Sunday going over to
Montana hunting; they had an awful time.62
60 Aviation Safety and Aircraft Piracy: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce and the Subcomm. on Trans. and Aeronautics, 91st Cong., 1st & 2nd
Sess. 78 (1970). David D. Thomas, Acting FAA Administrator, continued,
Mr. Dingell, I might say we have made provision for sportsmen.
Most of the pilots are sportsmen and we do carry rifles. The law on
piracy says "concealed." Our regulations say "concealed or uncon-
cealed on or about the person." They are checked with the steward-
ess. We carry them, and we have a large traffic in sportsmen
carrying guns.
Mr. Dingell. Different airlines tend to treat sportsmen very differ-
ently. I had one major airline return a cased firearm in totally dam-
aged condition.
Id. at 87-88.
41, See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
62 The Administrations Emergency Antihijacking Regulations: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Commerce, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1973).
The following remarks of FAA General Counsel John W. Barnum prompted this
discussion:
In the absence of a State statute specifically permitting State law en-
forcement officials to enforce a Federal law, there is, of course, the
simple fact that in many of the acts with which we are dealing, carry-
ing a concealed weapon is in fact a State offense. And the State offi-
cial is obviously empowered to enforce his own State law with
respect to carrying concealed weapons. One of the things which the
bill we proposed will do will be to raise from a misdemeanor level to
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When reenacted as the Antihijacking Act of 1974,68 the
prohibition on carrying a concealed weapon on the air-
craft included an explicit provision that the prohibition
"shall [not] apply to persons transporting weapons (other
than loaded firearms) contained in baggage which is not
accessible to passengers in flight if the presence of such
weapons has been declared to the air carrier." 64 The Sen-
ate Report explained,
The Committee has provided explicit provisions under
which sportsmen may transport weapons aboard aircraft
in air transportation. We feel that the right to bear arms is
also the right to transport arms for legitimate purposes
and, accordingly, have set forth procedures to be
followed.
The bill provides that persons may transport weapons
for sporting purposes if the presence of such weapons in
luggage or baggage is publicly declared prior to the pas-
sengers boarding the aircraft and is checked as baggage
and carried in the cargo hold of the aircraft. 65
The Air Transport Association of America (ATAA) had
expressed the need for an explicit provision on transport-
ing firearms legally:
The airlines are concerned that the section prescribing
"Criminal Penalties" for "Carrying Weapons Aboard Air-
craft" would prohibit the carrying of firearms in stowed
baggage. Such a procedure would cause great problems
for persons who for legitimate reasons, must transport
arms. To correct the language, we have submitted an
amendment which would permit the FAA Administrator to
a felony level the carrying of a concealed weapon onto an aircraft.
And that in itself, I am informed by the Justice Department, will en-
able additional States to have their State law enforcement officials
enforce the State law, there being the distinction in some States that
State law enforcement officials may enforce a Federal felony, but
may not enforce a Federal misdemeanor.
Id. at 87.
' Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(l)(3) (1982).
S. REP. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973).
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prescribe regulations for the necessary transportation of
firearms in the aircraft.6 6
Accordingly, ATAA recommended a rule that one may
not board or attempt to board an aircraft if he has "on or
about his person or his property intended to be carried into the
aircraft cabin a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon. "67
ATAA also suggested a provision that the prohibition
would not "apply to persons transporting weapons for
hunting or other sporting activities under regulations pre-
scribed by the Administrator."68
According to the House Conference Report, 69 the origi-
nal Senate bill
provided an exemption for the transportation of weapons
for sporting purposes if the presence of the weapons in
luggage or baggage was publicly declared before boarding
and was checked as baggage and carried in the cargo hold
of the aircraft. Such baggage or luggage could not be
opened within the airport confines.70
The House added an amendment which "required the
CAB to issue regulations requiring air carriers to make in-
surance policies available (for a reasonable charge) condi-
tioned to pay for loss or damage to property of a
passenger which he cannot lawfully carry in the passenger
compartment and must be transported as baggage."'7
The conference substitute omitted the prohibition against
opening baggage with firearms within the airport.72
While their report does not mention it, the conference
' Antihijacking Act of 1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aero-
nautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 390
(1973).
67 Id. at 391 (emphasis in original).
- Id. at 392 (emphasis in original). Congressman Dingell, presiding in the
same hearing, made a comment which relates to articles not prohibited: "I have a
pocketknife that turns them [magnetometers] on all the time." Id. at 456. Pock-
etknives apparently were not intended to be classified as deadly and dangerous
weapons.
,is, H.R. CONE. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3996.
71, Id. at 4011.
71 Id. This provision passed and is codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1516 (1982).
72 Id. at 4011.
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managers also omitted the language "for sporting pur-
poses," probably because firearms also could be trans-
ported for business, self-defense, or other lawful
purposes.
Congress amended the general prohibition against car-
rying a concealed weapon to include boarding or attempt-
ing to board an aircraft while having "on or about his
person or his property a concealed deadly or dangerous
weapon which is, or could be, accessible to such person in
flight."' 73 Transporting a firearm in checked baggage,
whether declared or not, clearly could not be a violation
of this provision. As passed, the exception states that the
prohibition "shall [not] apply to persons transporting
weapons (other than loaded firearms) contained in bag-
gage which is not accessible to passengers in flight if the
presence of such weapons has been declared to the air
carrier. 74
This exception is in part a truism implied by the prohi-
bition. The reference to declared firearms ignores the
fact that failure to declare a firearm transported in
checked baggage is not an element of the substantive of-
fense. Congress apparently intended the exception to
prevent a passenger from being charged with attempting
to board an aircraft with a concealed weapon if he did not
check the firearm but declared it to carrier personnel, in-
tending that it be surrendered at the loading gate or even
inside the aircraft. Under the exception, one presumably
could even carry the declared firearm onto the aircraft as
long as the firearm is not accessible in flight. That proce-
dure appears to have been routine at one time, particu-
larly for very valuable firearms.7 5 Finally, the exception
makes it clear that a declared firearm cannot be consid-
ered concealed, even if hidden from view, if located in in-
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1471(1)(1) (1982).
4 Id.
7 5 See, e.g., Randall v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 840, 845 (W.D. Ark.
1975); see generally 14 C.F.R. § 159.175(c)(3) (1986) (one may carry unassembled
or cased firearms in mobile lounges at Dulles International Airport).
1987] FIREARMS AND AIR CARRIER SECURITY 611
accessible baggage during the flight, or in the accessible
baggage before the flight commences.76
2. The Air Transportation Security Act
When it reenacted the Antihijacking Act in 1974, Con-
gress also enacted the Air Transportation Security Act.77
The latter for the first time authorized screening for
weapons in carryon baggage, and required that screening
procedures be uniform for all airlines. 78 Authorization
for screening appears in 49 U.S.C. § 1356(a), which
provides,
The Administrator shall prescribe or continue in effect
reasonable regulations requiring that all passengers and
all property intended to be carried in the aircraft cabin in air
transportation or intrastate air transportation be screened by
weapon-detecting procedures or facilities employed or operated
by employees or agents of the air carrier, intrastate air car-
rier, or foreign air carrier prior to boarding the aircraft for
such transportation. One year after August 5, 1974, or af-
ter the effective date of such regulations, whichever is
later, the Administrator may alter or amend such regula-
tions, requiring a continuation of such screeninig only to the
extent deemed necessary to assure security against acts of criminal
violence and aircraft piracy in air transportation and intra-
state air transportation. 79
Under this provision, only carryon baggage may be
screened for weapons, and it may be screened only to the
extent necessary to prevent hijacking or similar crimes.
The statute does not confer authority to screen baggage
that the passenger intends to check rather than carry into
the aircraft cabin.
7 In companion legislation, Congress passed the Hazardous Materials Trans-
portation Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1801-12 (1982). It provides in part,
"Nothing in this title shall be construed to prohibit or regulate the transportation
by an individual, for personal use, of any firearm... or any ammunition therefor,
or to prohibit any transportation of firearms or ammunition in commerce." Id. at
§ 1806(c).
77 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1356-58 (1982).
78 See id. at §§ 1356(a), 1357(a)(2)(c).
" Id. at § 1356(a) (emphasis added).
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Section 1357(a) of the same Title provides,
(1) The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration shall prescribe such reasonable rules and regula-
tions requiring such practices, methods and procedures
.. . as he may deem necessary to protect persons and
property aboard aircraft operating in air transportation or
intrastate air transportation against acts of criminal vio-
lence and aircraft piracy.
(2) In prescribing and amending rules and regulations
under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Administrator
shall -
(C) to the maximum extent practicable, require uniform
procedures for the inspection, detention, and search of persons and
property in air transportation and intrastate air transporta-
tion to assure their safety and to assure that they will re-
ceive courteous and efficient treatment, by air carriers,
their agents and employees, and by Federal, State, and lo-
cal law enforcement personnel engaged in carrying out
any air transportation security program established under
this section .... 80
Recognizing that baggage screening constitutes a
search under the fourth amendment, Congress obviously
sought to make such screening as uniform and non-intru-
sive as possible. An explanation of the need for the above
provision appears in the House Conference Report:
Because of the high incidence of aircraft hijacking and the
gravity of these offenses, the conferees have reluctantly
approved a security system which does allow routine searches of
passengers in contradiction to our cherished constitutional freedom.
At best such a search is unpleasant. Regrettably, there
have been numerous complaints from citizens throughout
the country and a number of complaints based on the ex-
periences of members of Congress themselves as to rude
and even hostile treatment by police and security employ-
ees. Because of this, the conferees agreed to the provision
which requires uniform procedures for the inspection, deten-
tion and search of persons under conditions which will as-
- Id. at § 1357(a) (emphasis added).
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sure that they receive "courteous and efficient treatment".
It is the intent of the conferees that the Secretary shall
give extremely careful attention to this provision and any
regulations and actions under this provision. The legaliza-
tion of these searches is a serious inroad into our basic individual
right to privacy. Since Congress has determined that this
inroad must be made, we should do all within our power
to assure that the unpleasant aspect of personal searches be
minimized to the fullest degree possible consonant with the in-
surance of air safety.8'
The right to expect uniform weapons screening and the
right to be warned of screening by conspicuous notice
also found expression in the Senate Report, which noted
that persons who activate the metal detector should be
given an opportunity to be screened again after removing
objects from their pockets:
If, at this time, the passenger still evokes a positive re-
sponse from the device, then and only then is he subject to
a search or frisk, but only if he first voluntarily consents. If
such consent is denied, then the individual shall forfeit his
opportunity on that occasion to be transported and the air
carrier shall deny his passage.82
The Senate Committee deplored abusive searches by
law officers, "abhorrent to individual freedom and the Bill
of Rights," and stressed the need for notice and
standardization:
Currently, the Department of Transportation has
posted notices at many airports informing passengers that
they and their hand baggage are subject to search. We...
believe that they should also inform the passenger of his
ultimate right to refuse to permit a search of his person or pos-
sessions.... Furthermore, we recommend that the current
screening and search process now being required by regu-
lation, be standardized in accord with the intent of this bill
and that appropriate notices be provided at airports noti-
fying passengers of the procedures to be followed and of
- H.R. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3996, 4010 (emphasis added).
- S. REP. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973).
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the passenger's right to refuse to be searched. If this is
done, it . . .will provide further safeguards to individual
liberties and freedom.83
The authority to screen only "property intended to be
carried in the aircraft cabin" under section 1356(a), and
the requirement that "uniform procedures" for screening
be followed under section 1357(a)(2)(C), mandate that a
passenger be given an opportunity to check baggage
before screening, that the baggage check-in area be lo-
cated before the x-ray screening system, and that only car-
ryon baggage be screened for weapons. Declaration and
check-in of firearms in inaccessible baggage form another
part of the uniform procedures mandated by the overall
regulatory scheme.
C. Loaded Firearms, Civil Penalties, and Screening Checked
Baggage for Explosives
1. The Prohibition on Loaded Firearms
In 1980 Congress amended the Antihijacking Act to
prohibit carrying loaded firearms in checked baggage.84
As amended, the statute makes it a misdemeanor for any-
one to place or attempt to place "a loaded firearm aboard
[an] aircraft in baggage or other property which is not ac-
cessible to passengers in flight."' 85  Congress also
amended the section of the statute which provides an ex-
ception for transporting declared firearms in baggage not
accessible in flight, by adding the parenthetical "(other
than loaded firearms)." 86 Finally, Congress added a new
subsection:
(A) [T]he term "firearm" means any starter gun and
any weapon which is designed to or has been converted to
expel any projectile by the action of an explosive; and
(B) the term "loaded firearm" means any firearm which
- Id. (emphasis added).
-4 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(1)(1)(B)(1982).
". Id.
" Id. at § 1472(l)(3).
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has a cartridge, a detonator, or powder in the chamber,
magazine, cylinder, or clip of such firearm. 87
Congresswoman Schroeder of Colorado sponsored the
amendments because, she explained, a baggage handler
in Denver had been killed when a loaded weapon in
checked baggage discharged.8 The passenger could not
be prosecuted in the absence of any criminal prohibi-
tion.89 In the only comment on the provision both in the
hearings and on the floor, Congresswoman Schroeder
explained,
The language of the bill makes it impossible for a gun to
go off, accidentally or otherwise. A firearm will be consid-
ered loaded if a cartridge, a detonator or powder is found
in the chamber, magazine, cylinder, or clip of the weapon.
Keeping ammunition completely separate from the fire-
arm is the best way I know of to keep it from going off.
This is no burden on a gun owner, collector or dealer car-
rying firearms while traveling. Gun clubs and organiza-
tions, as a safety measure, teach the practice of carrying
ammunition outside the firearm when it is not in use.
Since the focus is on prevention, implementation of the
provision would be easy. Imposing notices displayed at
ticket counters would make gun toters think twice and
then step out of line to empty their guns. In addition, any-
one who issues hunting licenses or permits, or sells guns
and ammunition, could easily inform their customers
about the new law.90
While the definition of "loaded firearm" seems fairly
clear, a literal reading of the statute may suggest that a
loaded magazine or clip not even inserted into a firearm
could make the firearm "loaded." Congresswoman
Schroeder's explanation, however, indicates that a loaded
clip or magazine "completely separate from the firearm"
87 Id. at § 1472(l)(4).
125 CONG. REC. 29,037 (1979). The firearm involved, a .357 revolver (prob-
ably a single action), was designed so that the hammer resting on a loaded cham-
ber could cause a discharge. See id.
See id.
I ld. at 29,036.
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or "outside the firearm" would not make the firearm
loaded.
2. Civil Penalty in Lieu of Criminal Prosecution
Besides the prohibition on loaded firearms, another
proposed amendment in 1980 would have allowed civil
penalties in lieu of criminal prosecution for attempting to
board an aircraft with a concealed firearm. This amend-
ment did not pass that year, but was later enacted in
1984. 9 1
Testimony at the 1979 hearings before the House Sub-
committee on Aviation revealed that the screening pro-
gram and provision for carriage of firearms in checked
baggage passed in 1974 achieved excellent results.9 2 FAA
Administrator Longhorne Bond testified that most for-
eign air carrier hijackings stemmed from lack of or defec-
tive screening: "In contrast to the foreign experience, no
U.S. hijacking since 1973 has involved real firearms or ex-
plosives passing undetected through passenger screening
points."9 3
In the period 1973-78, over two billion persons and
over three billion carryon items went through screening.94
Seventeen thousand firearms were detected, the majority
by x-ray inspection.95 FAA Security Chief Richard Lally
noted,
The figures for that period indicate that of the 17,000 fire-
arms detected, 6,000 were detected under circumstances
that caused the arrests of the persons involved. The re-
mainder would have been what you might call an inno-
cent-type firearm, that is, a firearm in the possession of
someone who had a license and was authorized to carry it,
but who failed to declare it before going through the
9, See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1471(c),(d) (West Supp. 1986).
92 See Aircraft Piracy, International Terrorism: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation




, Id. at 65.
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system.96
He might have added that many of the arrested persons
also had possession of firearms which did not require
licenses under state law, and that authorities ultimately
dismissed many of the charges.
Until 1984, the maximum criminal fine under federal
law for boarding or attempting to board an aircraft with
an accessible firearm stood at $1,000.8 In that year Con-
gress raised the maximum criminal fine under 49 U.S.C.
§ 1472(1)(1) to $10,000. 9 Moreover, Congress amended
section 1471 by adding a new subsection (d), which pro-
vides for a civil penalty in the same amount:
f5 Id. Given the widespread possession of firearms, particularly in certain parts
of the country, it is amazing that only 17,000 firearms were detected out of over
two billion passengers and their carryon baggage screened. The following ex-
change occurred between FAA spokesmen Bond and Lally and Congressman
Snyder:
Mr. Bond. Mr. Chairman, one of the phenomena that we encoun-
ter is people who just are accustomed to carrying firearms. And in
some of the frontier areas of the United States-Texas and Kentucky
come to mind-we find people who would go right on the airplane
with their gun, just as they carry it around out on the ranch -
Mr. Snyder. Have you read Fishbait Miller's book?
Mr. Lally. I have, yes, sir.
Mr. Snyder. He mentions in there I was one of the few Members
he ever knew who was known to carry a gun on the floor of the
House. I have since ceased to do that.
Mr. Bond. Do you carry them in committee, Mr. Snyder?
Mr. Snyder. We are going to see how you do with those FAA regs.
[Laughter.]
Id. at 70.
97 Although it did not pass, the House bill would have established a civil penalty
for boarding or attempting to board an air carrier with a concealed weapon on or
about one's person or accessible property. The committee report explained,
Testimony at our hearings indicated that prosecutors and juries have
been reluctant to impose criminal penalties in certain hijacking-re-
lated cases, including cases involving misguided attempts at humor,
inebriated passengers, or attempts to board aircraft carrying con-
cealed weapons where no further illegal activity is contemplated.
Civil penalties may be more acceptable in such cases, and adding
this sanction will help discourage these dangerous activities.
H.R. REP. No. 424, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1979).
99 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1837, 2189 (to be codified at 49
U.S.C. § 1472(l)(1)).
" See id.
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Except for law enforcement officers of any municipal or
State government or officers or employees of the Federal
Government, who are authorized or required within their
official capacities to carry arms, or other persons who may
be so authorized under regulations issued by the Adminis-
trator, whoever while aboard, or while attempting to
board, any aircraft in, or intended for operation in, air
transportation or intrastate air transportation, has on or
about his person or his property a concealed deadly or
dangerous weapon, which is, or would be, accessible to
such person in flight shall be subject to a civil penalty of
not more than $10,000 which shall be recoverable in a civil
action brought in the name of the United States.' 0 0
The foregoing provision includes two notable excep-
tions. First, any law enforcement officer, including auxil-
iary sheriff's deputies, is exempt if he or she is officially
authorized to carry arms at any time.' 0 ' Second, "other
persons who may be so authorized under regulations is-
sued by the Administrator" could be interpreted to in-
clude persons who attempt to carry firearms in checked
baggage, but who inadvertently introduce it into the ster-
ile area because an airline has no baggage check-in before
x-ray screening.10 2 Certainly such a person would not be
attempting to board the aircraft with the firearm.
Congress added the civil penalty because criminal pros-
ecution may not be warranted when a passenger inno-
cently forgets to declare a firearm later detected in
carryon baggage.10 3 The Senate report states,
It should be noted that, taken together, subsections 4(a)
and 4(c) of the bill increase the range of punishments
available for a person who boards or attempts to board an
aircraft with a firearm or other dangerous weapon. At the
lower end of the spectrum is a civil penalty of up to
$10,000. A civil penalty of some amount could be appro-
priate, for example, for a businessman who has a firearm
too 49 U.S.C.A. § 1471(d) (West Supp. 1986).
lot See id.
,o. See id.
lo See S. REP. No. 619, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1984).
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in his briefcase but, in spite of signs clearly reminding him
to do so, forgets to declare it and turn it over to the airline
for shipment as is required by 18 U.S.C. 922(e).[ t0 4] At
the opposite end of the scale is a criminal penalty of up to
five years' imprisonment and a $25,000 fine for a person
who willfully or recklessly carries a weapon aboard a
plane. Such a penalty would be appropriate if the person,
for example, displayed the weapon in the course of an al-
tercation with a fellow passenger or with a flight attendant.
In between is a criminal misdemeanor penalty of a
$10,000 fine and one year's imprisonment which might be
an appropriate level of punishment for a person's second
offense of "forgetting" to transfer his personal firearm to
the flight crew for shipment with him or for a person who
consciously decided to carry a firearm with him in the
cabin of a plane with no intention of using it but merely to
see if he is clever enough to defeat the airport security
system.' 05
3. Screening Checked Baggage for Explosives
After the hijacking of a TWA flight from Athens,
Greece, and the unexplained explosion of an Air India
flight, both in 1985, Congress held hearings on bills to
improve air carrier security abroad. 0 6 A number of com-
ments were made concerning baggage screening for ex-
plosives, and legislators also discussed the subject of
firearms in carryon baggage. Through the course of these
hearings, the adequacy of the domestic security program
became immediately clear. Senator Daniel Patrick Moyni-
han began the testimony by recalling the hijacking epi-
demic before the 1974 legislation mandating the
- Actually, 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) (1982) does not explicitly require a passenger
to declare or turn over a firearm to the airline for shipment. Although section
922(e) does require a nonpassenger who ships a firearm in a container to declare
it to the carrier, an exception exists for a passenger traveling with a firearm who
delivers it to the carrier. A passenger who carries a firearm on his person without
delivering it to the carrier is not regulated by this provision. See infra notes 340-97
and accompanying text for an extensive analysis of section 922(e).
S. REP. No. 619, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984) (footnote added).
See infra note 107.
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screening of carryon baggage: "After 1974 it stopped.
The airport security measures have worked to a degree
that I do not know anyone could have expected. It has
just put an end to that."'' 0 7
Senator Paul Simon pointed out that plastic explosives
cannot be detected by the usual mechanical devices, but
that vapor detection was reaching a breakthrough for
screening both persons and checked baggage. 08 Vapor
detection appears to be far less intrusive for fourth
amendment purposes than x-ray, because the operator
does not actually see the objects in the luggage. By con-
trast, Congressman Norman Y. Mineta pointed out that El
Al physically searches both carryon and checked baggage
and strip-searches passengers. 0 9
Those attending the hearings discussed in some detail
the feasibility of x-ray searches. Billie H. Vincent, Direc-
tor of FAA Civil Aviation Security, did not want to discuss
the subject in a public hearing, but made clear that x-ray
screening "is being done in certain circumstances ...
[B]ut again, do we want to keep the pink elephants
away?"' 0 He apparently viewed routine x-ray searches of
checked baggage as necessary only for certain interna-
tional flights.
When asked whether screening personnel presently do
an adequate job of keeping guns from being carried on
board, Mr. Vincent gave this revealing response:
First let me add, on an annual basis in the U.S. domestic
system, the security system's preboard screening by the air
carriers pick [sic] up somewhere around 2,800 handguns a
year, and there are a substantial number of arrests as a
result. Generally, those people who are identified are not
people with evil intent but rather, frequently people ac-
companying a passenger to the airport who forget they
,o7 International Airport Security and Antihyacking Measures: Hearings on S. 1321, S.
1326, and S. 1343 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1985).
." Id. at 28.
Id. at 49.
Id.
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have a weapon in their purse or on their person, and fre-
quently it is in their purse for protection."'
Karen Lantz of the International Federation of Flight
Attendants proposed limits on carryon baggage as a
deterrent to hijackings." 2 Even physical inspection of
carryon baggage leaves room for human error: "A more
effective measure would be simply to limit the number of
carryon bags permitted on board the aircraft, thereby lim-
iting the means by which terrorists may smuggle weapons
and explosives on board."'" 3 Ms. Lantz maintained that
the increased baggage load allowed by expanded baggage
racks and overhead bins pose a security risk." 4
Doyle Reed of the Airport Operators Council Interna-
tional noted that equipment currently in use does not
screen baggage and cargo adequately, and that sophisti-
cated bomb detection equipment must be utilized. He
stated, "The objective of this initiative is the eventual ca-
pability of 100 percent baggage screening for explosives
when deemed appropriate for certain high risk flights."' 15
Clearly, unloaded firearms in checked baggage pose no
danger and no one in Congress has suggested elimination
of this kind of carriage. Moreover, the coming use of va-
por detection equipment to screen checked baggage for
explosives promises to be far more effective, yet less in-
trusive under the fourth amendment, than the use of x-
ray.
it' Id.
112 Id. at 85.
1.- Id. at 83.
,,4 Id. at 87.
1 - Id. at 94.
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III. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE ANTIHIJACKING ACT
AND THE AIR TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
A. Attempting to Board an Aircraft With a Deadly Weapon
Concealed on or about One's Person or Accessible
Property
Hijackings and willful, reckless acts involving firearms
are beyond the scope of this article. This analysis con-
cerns the elements of the malum prohibitum offense of car-
rying or attempting to carry a firearm aboard an aircraft.
49 U.S.C.A. § 1472(1) provides,
(1) With respect to any aircraft in, or intended for oper-
ation in air transportation or intrastate air transportation,
whoever-
(A) while aboard, or while attempting to board such
aircraft has on or about his person or his property a
concealed deadly or dangerous weapon which is, or
could be, accessible to such person in flight;
(B) has placed, attempted to place, or attempted to
have placed a loaded firearm aboard such aircraft in
baggage or other property which is not accessible to
passengers in flight; or
(C) has on or about his person, or who placed, at-
tempted to place, or attempted to have placed aboard
such aircraft any bomb or similar explosive or incendi-
ary device;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both.
(2) Whoever willfully and without regard for the safety of
human life, or with reckless disregard for the safety of
human life, shall commit an act prohibited by paragraph (1)
of this subsection, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(3) Paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection shall not apply to
law enforcement officers of any municipal or State govern-
ment, or officers or employees of the Federal Government,
who are authorized or required within their official capacities
to carry arms, or to persons who may be authorized, under
regulations issued by the Secretary of Transportation to
carry deadly or dangerous weapons in air transportation or
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intrastate air transportation; nor shall it apply to persons
transporting weapons (other than loaded firearms) con-
tained in baggage which is not accessible to passengers in
flight if the presence of such weapons has been declared to
the air carrier.
(4) For purposes of this subsection-
(A) the term "firearm" means any starter gun and any
weapon which is designed to or has been converted to ex-
pel any projectile by the action of an explosive; and
(B) the term "loaded firearm" means any firearm which
has a cartridge, a detonator, or powder in the chamber,
magazine, cylinder, or clip of such firearm.' 16
Although this analysis concerns primarily the offense
stated in (1)(A), the complete subsection is set forth to
demonstrate the overall scheme. Offenses under (1) vary
in danger but include only victimless crimes per se; of-
fenses under (2) involve willful and reckless misconduct
which would be mala in se.
1. Knowledge, Intent, and Concealment
The courts stand divided on the extent to which knowl-
edge and intent constitute elements of the offense. The
problem revolves in part around a determination of
whether or not concealment should be determined by an
objective or a subjective standard. In United States v. Lee
117 the government obtained conviction of a defendant
who attempted to board an aircraft with a .38 caliber pis-
tol in a briefcase which also contained money receipts.' 1 8
He testified that after arriving late for his flight, he forgot
about the pistol. The court held that defendant would not
be guilty if he was "ignorant of the fact that the pistol was
in his briefcase." 1 9 The court stated,
It has long been held that concealment of contraband in a
,,,t 49 U.S.C.A. § 1472(1) (West Supp. 1986).
11 383 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), rev'd, 539 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1976).
lit Lee, 383 F. Supp. at 1034. The Sixth Circuit ultimately reversed the convic-
tion, but agreed with the district court's interpretation of section 1472. See 539
F.2d at 608.
I IIILee, 383 F. Supp. at 1034-35.
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legal sense is a knowing concealment and not the mere
fact that the contraband is found in the possession of the
defendant....
Moreover, a serious question of due process of law
would be raised if a person could be convicted under sub-
section (1) on the theory that any person presenting him-
self and his carry-on luggage for boarding inspection
would be held strictly accountable for whatever may have
been inadvertently left in his carry-on luggage or even
might have been surreptitiously placed there by the act of
another, for whatever reason. 120
Following the above reasoning, United States v. Pou' 2t
dismissed an information for attempting to board with a
.45 automatic because the information failed to allege
"that the defendant had knowledge that the weapon was
'on or about his person and his property'. Knowledge of
the presence of a concealed dangerous weapon is an ele-
ment of the offense codified in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1472."' 122
Without alleging knowledge, the information charged de-
fendant "with the strict liability crime of attempting to
board a commercial aircraft while in possession of a
weapon someone else has knowingly concealed."'' 23
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit discussed subjective intent to conceal and objective
concealment in United States v. Brown, 124 reversing a con-
viction for submitting for inspection a flight bag contain-
ing a tear gas pistol.1 25 The court held that submission of
property for routine search may negate both intent to
conceal and concealment per se:
In examining what constitutes "concealment", we are
cognizant that the circumstances surrounding preflight
boarding procedures of aircraft have been drastically al-
120 Id. at 1035.
2 484 F. Supp. 972 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
,22 Id. at 974.
" Id. at 975. But see United States v. Harris, 381 F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (dictum confuses knowledge with specific intent and states that knowledge
is not necessary for conviction).
124 508 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1974).
12. Id. at 434.
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tered between the time of the passage of § 1472(1) in
1961 and the time of the incident before us in August
1972. In 1961, prior to the institution of compulsory pre-
flight boarding examination of luggage and person, any
nondisclosure to airline personnel of an object considered
to be a deadly or dangerous weapon could properly con-
stitute a concealment of the weapon within the purview of
the statute .... However, by August 1972, according to
the stipulation, passengers intending to board commercial
aircraft at the Kansas City airport were required, as a pre-
condition for air travel, to present their carry-on luggage
to airline personnel for a routine search and to present
themselves for magnetometer detection....
The institution of these preflight boarding procedures,
such as those carried out during the incident in question,
requires a court to consider whether a passenger who vol-
untarily tenders his hand luggage to a qualified inspector
is concealing any item which will be observed upon rou-
tine inspection. Ordinarily, the act of a passenger present-
ing his hand luggage to responsible airline personnel for
inspection suggests an intent to disclose rather than to
conceal those items within the bag which will come into
view on ordinary inspection. 2 6
Concealment may exist even though a passenger ten-
ders the baggage for screening. 2 7 If a passenger denies
that he is carrying a weapon, this denial "may imply an
intent to conceal.' 28 (It also could imply objective con-
cealment.) "A potentially dangerous object may be hid-
den in a false bottom or secret compartment; a knife or
gun may be wrapped in a wet diaper; or other evidence
may exist indicating concealment."'' 2 9
While these observations concern hand searches of car-
ryon baggage, similar principles apply to other screening
procedures. For example, objective concealment from x-
ray would occur if a person encased a weapon in lead or
disassembled and positioned it in such a manner as to
12c, Id. at 431-32 (citations and footnote omitted).
,.7 See id. at 432.
128 Id.
129~ Id.
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conceal its shape. FAA security investigators use the test
of whether a defendant has "artfully concealed" the
weapon, in determining whether or not a passenger inten-
tionally introduced a firearm into a sterile area. 30
The Eighth Circuit rejected the intent to conceal stan-
dard in favor of an objective concealment test in United
States v. Flum.'3 ' After purchasing a ticket, defendant im-
mediately proceeded through the security gate because
the passengers were already boarding.13 2  Authorities
found a butcher knife wrapped in loose clothing in a suit-
case, and a switchblade knife "inside a small gray box
which was on the counter with other belongings."' 133 This
language suggests that the box had been on defendant's
person and placed on a counter while he underwent metal
detector screening. Holding that "intent to conceal is not
an essential element of the offense,"'' 3 4 the court com-
mented, "To the extent that any dicta [in our opinion in
Brown] may impliedly suggest that intent is a necessary in-
gredient of the element of concealment, we decline to fol-
low it, in light of our en banc holding today."'3 5 The court
further concluded that intent to use a weapon to commit a
crime on board is not required. 3 6 The court did not
question the need to prove knowledge of the weapon's
existence, but noted that "[n]o issue of scienter is present
in this case. It is undisputed that defendant knew the na-
ture and approximate location of each of the knives. ' '11 7
The Flum court did agree with the Brown holding that
"the fact of concealment is an essential element and must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt."'138 Submission of
articles for inspection may or may not negate conceal-
so FAA letters to passengers, 1983-84, pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 107.21(a)
(1986), made available to author under the Freedom of Information Act.
,-, 518 F.2d 39 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
132 Id. at 41.
-3 Id. (footnote omitted).
,.1 Id. at 45.
Id. at 44 n.9.
". Id. at 44.
,-1 Id. at 44-45 n.10.
-8 Id. at 45.
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ment, depending upon the other circumstances of the
case:
We do not intimate that the weapon must in all cases be
in open view prior to inspection. The trier of the fact
could consider, for example, evidence offered on behalf of
the defendant that he had informed the inspector of the
presence and location of a deadly or dangerous weapon
among his belongings. The obviousness of the weapon is a
factor to be taken into consideration under all of the rele-
vant facts and circumstances .... The inspection process
in a particular case may be an objective fact to be consid-
ered with other objective facts on the issue of conceal-
ment. Not every inspection will uncover a concealed
weapon, and no congressional purpose to let the fact of a
security inspection operate as an absolute defense to the
charge can be found in either the statute or its legislative
history. Each case must stand upon its own facts.13 9
Flum perhaps exaggerates the distinction between in-
tent to conceal and the fact of concealment, for the fact
exists often because of intent. Moreover, the court does
not dispute that one must know he has a concealed
weapon on or about his person or accessible property.
Practically, the key to the concealment issue in most cases
appears to be whether or not the weapon has been artfully
disguised or positioned. A firearm laying flat in a suitcase
may not be concealed from the x-ray operator, but the
same firearm laying in a position where its outline is not
immediately evident may be concealed. The old test of
whether a weapon may be seen by the naked eye appears
outdated in this age of x-ray vision.
2. On or about the Person and Accessible in Flight
To constitute a violation, a weapon must not only be
concealed, but must be "on or about [the passenger's]
person or his property" in such manner as "is, or could
be, accessible to such person in flight."'' 40 This encom-
'9 Id.
14o 49 U.S.C.A. § 1472(1)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1986).
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passes weapons on one's body or worn inside clothing as
well as in carryon baggage, and excludes weapons in
checked baggage. When an airline maintains no baggage
check-in prior to x-ray screening, or directs a late passen-
ger to proceed directly to the boarding area, apparently
no violation would occur if the passenger intended to
check the baggage. This seems particularly true with bag-
gage too large to be carried aboard by the passenger,
since such baggage would not be accessible in flight.
No federal judicial opinions analyze the meaning of "on
or about" one's person or property. However, the re-
ported decisions do seem to follow the intent of Congress
by applying the terms to weapons in clothing or carryon
baggage and not to those in checked baggage. 4 1 The de-
cisions have applied the prohibition to weapons found in
pockets, 142 briefcases, 143 and hand luggage. 44 As noted
in the congressional hearings and debates in 1961, Con-
gress took the terms "on or about his person" from state
law provisions which had a well defined meaning. 45 It
has long been the rule that a traveler who carries luggage
containing a firearm does not carry the firearm "on or
about his person." 146 Statements from a sampling of
court opinions illustrate this point: "The evidence shows
that the defendant did not carry about his person ... the
pistol, but that the pistol was taken about and placed in
his satchel or suit case."' 147 "It seems to us that when the
statute prohibits the concealing of a weapon 'on or about
,41 See infra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
,42 See, e.g., United States v. Ware, 315 F. Supp. 1333, 1334-35 (W.D. Okla.
1970); United States v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 415, 417-18 (W.D. Tex. 1969).
,4. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 539 F.2d 606, 607 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1973).
144 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 381 F. Supp. 1095, 1096-97 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
,4. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
14, See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
147 State v. Weston, 108 S.C. 383, -, 94 S.E. 871, 871 (1918). Accord Carr v.
State, 34 Ark. 448, 450 (1879) (pistol "in good faith being transported"); Boles v.
State, 86 Ga. 225, -, 12 S.E. 361, 362 (1890) (carrying pistol in a basket for
transportation purposes only did not constitute carriage of concealed weapon);
State v. Parker, 152 N.C. 790,-, 67 S.E. 35, 36 (1910) ("carrying a pistol in his
suit case" not equivalent to carrying a concealed weapon).
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his person' that it means the weapon must be actually con-
cealed on the person, or in such close proximity that it can
be readily used as though on the person."'' 48 A pistol en-
cased in a scabbard inside saddlebags is not carried
"about the person," but a pistol carried in a shoulder bag
or a large handbag is "about the person."' 4 9 'About the
person' must mean that it is so connected with the person
as to be readily accessible for use or surprise if
desired." 50
Under a federal regulation adopted in 1962, just a year
after FAA spokesmen explained the term "on or about his
person" to exclude checked baggage, the FAA promul-
gated the following regulation for National and Dulles
Airports in Washington, D.C.: "No person. . . may carry
any weapon .. . on or about his person, openly or con-
cealed, on the Airport without the written permission of
the Airport Manager."' 5' In United States v. Moore 5 2 the
defendant entered the screening area with a loaded re-
volver in his briefcase. 5 3 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
conviction, agreeing that the defendant committed the act
willfully and with knowledge. 154 In dictum the court ad-
ded, "Seemingly there would have been a violation even if
the weapon had been in the suitcase which was checked
for shipment in the baggage compartment, for the regula-
tion proscribes bringing such a weapon on to the airport
148 People v. Liss, 406 Ill. 419, -, 94 N.E.2d 320, 322 (1950) (pistol under
elevated seat not "on or about" driver's person). Accord Wilson v. United States,
198 F.2d 299, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (question of whether pistol under car seat was
"on or about" driver's person was a question for the jury); cf. Dubin v. State, 397
A.2d 132, 134 (Del. 1979) (weapon in glove compartment held not "on or about"
the person); but cf Schraeder v. State, 28 Ohio App. 248, -, 162 N.E. 647, 649
(1928) (revolver hidden in car door beside the driver found to be "about" his
person).
14.. Schaafv. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 429, 430-31, 258 S.E.2d 574, 575 (1979).
Id.
27 Fed. Reg. 9446 (1962) (codified as amended at 14 C.F.R. § 159.79
(1986)).
'5 586 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1033.
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and is not confined to the embarkation area."' 155 This rea-
soning mistakenly equates "possession" (here, construc-
tive possession) with "on or about his person."156
Prosecutions for carrying concealed weapons past x-ray
devices usually proceed under state or local law rather
than the Antihijacking Act. 157 In the Florida case of State
v. Molins, m58 for example, "the defendant, about to board a
plane, placed his carry-on luggage, a closed, zippered can-
vas bag on the conveyor belt at a security checkpoint" at
an airport, revealing a loaded pistol inside a smaller zip-
pered bag.5 9 The court did not even consider whether
the gun was "on" the person, but considered whether it
was sufficiently accessible to be "about" the person.'60
The Florida appellate court reversed the trial court's dis-
missal, which had been based on "the bare bones allega-
tion..., that the firearm was doubly encased."' 16 1 But the
appellate court added, "It may be that it can be shown at
trial, or even beforehand through a more detailed motion
I' ld. at 1032 n.2. The court added, "Moreover, the regulation's proscription
of all weapons, whether or not concealed, suggests that its drafters were not so
concerned with illicit motivations as with absolutely excluding all guns from the
airport." Id. at 1033.
156 The FAA has acted to rectify the problem through a recent notice of
rulemaking, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,290 (1986), which states,
Many passengers, although aware of these security regulations, are
unaware that they may be prosecuted if they fail to have the airport
manager's permission to carry weapons in securely packed baggage
onto any area of Washington National Airport or Washington Dulles
International Airport, including the terminals, for the purpose of
checking them in an inaccessible part of the aircraft. It should be
noted that historically the rule has not been used to prosecute indi-
viduals who are carrying a weapon to be checked as baggage and
who do not otherwise enter a secured area ....
Persons carrying weapons properly prepared for air transporta-
tion do not pose a threat to the security of the airport because their
weapons are unloaded and carried in containers which are suitable
for air transportation. Weapons prepared in this manner are not im-
mediately accessible. Therefore, the FAA is considering clarifying
the existing rule to make it explicitly inapplicable to these persons.
157 See infra notes 158-162 and accompanying text.




1987] FIREARMS AND AIR CARRIER SECURITY 631
to dismiss, that the firearm was not 'readily
accessible.' "162
The California case of People v. Dunn163 determined,
contrary to the general rule, that a pistol in a locked suit-
case was "upon his person."'' 64 Defendant was a non-pas-
senger who took his suitcase through x-ray screening
intending to store it in an airport locker. 65 The only au-
thority cited by the Dunn court held no more than that a
loaded firearm in a zippered briefcase in defendant's
hands was "upon his person."' 166 The only opinion ever
to cite Dunn rejected the Dunn analysis, reasoning that
"upon his person" requires that the prohibited object be
'actually upon or attached to the person, or carried or
held in actual physical possession, - such as clothing, ap-
parel, or ornaments, or things contained therein, or at-
tached thereto, or property held or carried in the
hands.' "167
The above cases shed some light on state law interpre-
tations of "on or about his person," but the federal prohi-
bition differs because it also includes weapons in one's
162 Id. The dissenting opinion notes,
The requirement that the firearm in question be on the person of or
'readily accessible' to the defendant is imposed because the very
purpose of forbidding carrying a concealed weapon is to prevent its
being suddenly produced in an ambush-like manner to the surprise
of another who was previously unaware that his antagonist was
armed .... I entirely agree with the trial court that, as a matter of
law, a firearm which can be secured only by unzipping two separate
containers could not possibly be employed in this fashion and thus
does not fall within the statutory definition.
Id. (emphasis in original).
163 61 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 132 Cal. Rptr. 921 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1976).
1 132 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
lw. Id.
... See People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 255 N.Y.S.2d 833
(1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 936 (1965).
1 G7 People v. Squadere, 88 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, -, 151 Cal. Rptr. 616, 618
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1978) (construing alcohol prohibition in vehicle)
(quoting People v. McElroy, 116 Cal. 583, 586, 48 P. 718, 719 (1897)). The
Squadere court stated, " '[The prohibition] was not intended to include property
removed from the person and laid aside, however immediately it may be retained
in the presence or constructive control or possession of the owner .... . 151
Cal. Rptr. at 618 (quoting McElroy, 116 Cal. at 586, 48 P. at 719).
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property if accessible during flight. In the absence of fed-
eral precedent, the majority rule enunciated by the state
courts seems dispositive, especially since it accords with
congressional intent.
3. What is a "Deadly or Dangerous Weapon"?
Aside from loaded firearms, the meaning and scope of
"deadly or dangerous weapon" under the statute is not
always clear. As predicted in Congress, 168 lack of a suffi-
cient definition has led to confusion and unfair prosecu-
tions. Courts have found that unloaded firearms
constitute deadly or dangerous weapons because they still
can be used for hijacking, and they can be loaded in-
stantly. 169 Distinguishing objects that are weapons per se
from the many objects which may be used as weapons, the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Dishman ' 70 found that "a
starter pistol is in no different position than a toy gun or
candy gun or pair of scissors."' 7' Thus, only weapons per
se, and not objects which are merely usable as weapons,
fall within the prohibition. This excludes the following:
"A starter pistol, toy or candy pistol useable [sic] as a
lookalike real thing; a razor useable as a knife; a business-
man's letter opener useable as a dagger; a fountain pen
useable to assimilate a pistol in the course of a rob-
bery."' 1 72 Since Dishman, Congress has defined firearm to
include starter guns. 173
Under the Dishman rationale, the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. Brown 174 found a tear gas pistol to be a dan-
gerous weapon per se, but submission to search meant
that it was not concealed. 75 The court suggested that the
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Dishman, 486 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Ware, 315 F. Supp. 1333, 1334-35 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
171, 486 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1973).
171 Id. at 732.
,72 Id. at 732 n.4.
171 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(I)(4)(A) (1982).
,74 508 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1974).
17.1 Id. at 430, 432.
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following persons might be prosecuted erroneously under
the statute: a woman with knitting needles or scissors, a
boy scout with a hunting knife or hatchet in his backpack,
and a mother with a toy gun in her child's toy bag.176 In
1973 the FAA circulated to air carriers and law enforce-
ment personnel (but did not announce to the public)
guidelines for determination of objects as weapons. 77
The weapons list in the guidelines included firearms,
starter pistols, flare pistols and air guns; sabers, swords,
hunting knives, and knives considered illegal by local law;
bludgeons, billy clubs, blackjacks and similar instruments;
and ice picks, straight razors, elongated scissors, and toy
weapons. 1
78
In United States v. Margraf179 the government secured
conviction of a musician passenger for carrying a pocket
knife he used as a tool.18 0  Carrying the pocket knife did
not violate the local laws in either the state of departure
or the state of destination.'"' A strong dissent argued that
the majority of the court applied the statute in a discrimi-
natory manner, and that the prosecution violated due pro-
cess because the passenger did not receive notice that the
knife would be considered a dangerous weapon. 8 2 The
government confessed error on appeal to the Supreme
Court because of the FAA guidelines "that only large
knives or those considered illegal under state law should
be considered weapons for this regulatory purpose."'
81 3
The complaint was remanded to the district court to allow
the government to dismiss the charges.
8 4
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Flum determined
that a switchblade knife with a 3 and 3/4 inch blade and a
176 Id. at 431.
,77 Id. at 433 n.4.
178 Id.
.... 483 F.2d 708 (3d Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973),
remanded for dismissal, 493 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1974).
.. Id. at 712-13.
Id. at 715.
182 Id. at 714, 722-23.
Margraf, 493 F.2d at 1207.
I"4 Id.
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butcher knife with a 7 and 7/8 inch blade were prohibited
weapons.1 85 As in many cases, the passenger intended to
check his bag but was late for the flight. 8 6 While most of
the opinion concerned the intent to conceal issue, t87 the
dissenting opinion argued that
[t]he decision of the majority permits imposition of crimi-
nal liability upon the housewife who carries scissors in her
sewing bag; the fisherman who carries a scaling knife in his
tackle box; the professional who carries a letter opener in
his briefcase; the doctor who carries scalpels in his medical
bag; and the tradesman who carries a hammer in his tool
kit. ' 88
Almost any object can be put to use as a weapon. Aside
from firearms, many objects used in sports, work, and rec-
reation serve capably as weapons. BB guns, knives, golf
clubs, martial arts equipment, bows and arrows, and shish
kebab skewers are only a few items which could result in
an arrest. In fairness to the public, the FAA should post
signs at screening checkpoints listing items it considers
prohibited.
B. Baggage Screening and the Fourth Amendment
Like other members of the general public, persons
transporting firearms must submit their persons and car-
ryon baggage for screening to detect weapons. 89 When
the federal government initiated this program, the courts
had to consider the serious fourth amendment problems
these searches raised. At common law, warrantless
searches were not conducted of anyone except suspected
felons, and then only incident to arrest. 90 "The only vic-
tims of such searches were those who, as probable felons,
were the objects of hue and cry, hot pursuit, or an arrest
- 518 F.2d 39, 41 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). See supra notes
131-139 and accompanying text for additional discussion of the Flum case.
I.- Id.
1"7 See id. at 41-45.
'"' Id. at 48.
See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1356(a) (West Supp. 1986).
T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 28, 39 (1969).
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warrant."' 9 ' As one law review commentator notes,
''mass passenger searches represent precisely the type of
general search which the fourth amendment was designed
to prevent."''92 The same writer concluded that "such a
mass search would be constitutionally acceptable only if
the passenger were given a final option of avoiding the
search by placing such items in stowage."'9 3 If under de-
regulation an air carrier locates its baggage check-in on
the wrong side of the x-ray, no opportunity exists to check
baggage before screening. The following discussion ana-
lyzes judicial opinions concerning the fourth amendment
issues related to the screening of carryon and checked
baggage.
1. The Opportunity to Check Baggage and Avoid a Search
Perhaps the strongest reason why the search of carryon
baggage may be said not to violate the fourth amendment
is that one has an opportunity to check baggage first, and
authorities do not search checked baggage for weapons.
Baggage that one does not want searched may be
checked, subject to the proviso that such baggage may be
screened for explosives or incendiary devices. 194
In United States v. Edwards 195 the passenger had been
warned of a search with a metal detector by "two large
printed signs" at the boarding gate. 196 The court noted
that "in order to bring itself within the test of reasonable-
ness applicable to airport searches, the Government must
give the citizen fair warning, before he enters the area of
search, that he is at liberty to proceed no further."'' 97 The
concurring opinion noted that being able to check bag-
191 Id. at 39.
,92 Comment, Airport Freight and Passenger Searches: Application of Fourth Amendment
Standards, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 953, 981 (1973).
", Id. at 1002.
",i See 14 C.F.R. § 108.9 (1986). See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the screening of checked baggage for explosives.
498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 499.
1I7 Id. at 501.
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gage before undergoing screening makes the search con-
sistent with the fourth amendment:
Here, however, there was no such coercion. All baggage
is not generally subject to search according to the FAA's
directives; rather, only carry-on baggage is generally sub-
ject to search. Thus, one is not forced to choose between
flying to one's destination and having one's baggage
searched. Rather one may merely consign any baggage he
does not want searched to the baggage compartment.
The only imposition upon the passenger then is not hav-
ing the bag during the flight and, perhaps, a little wait at
the destination for his luggage. Clearly this is not the
same case involved when the only way to avoid search is to
forego flying. The conclusion, therefore, must be that a
carry-on luggage search, unlike the personal search, may
be justified on a consent basis.' 98
No authority exists for conducting weapons screening
of baggage checked or to be checked. 199 In United States v.
Williams 200 the Second Circuit stated, "[W]e hold that
there was implied consent to search the carry-on baggage
by virtue of the fact that baggage which one does not want
to have searched may be consigned to the baggage com-
partment. ' 20 1 Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court has
noted, "The passenger has the choice of checking the
baggage for shipment rather than hand carrying it.
Checked baggage is not subject to the inspection proce-
dures authorized by the Air Transportation Security Act
of 1974.'202
Absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, an
unconsented search of checked baggage for weapons vio-
lates the fourth amendment.0 3 In United States v. Cyzew-
-' Id. at 504.
'm Checked baggage, of course, can be screened for explosives and incendiary
devices. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
!- 516 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1975).
201 Id. at 12.
202 State v. Salit, 613 P.2d 245, 254 n.28 (Alaska 1980).
203 See infra notes 204-213 and accompanying text. See also Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (consent to search checked baggage must be freely and vol-
untarily given); United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942, 947 (5th Cir. 1974) (re-
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ski..4 the majority upheld a warrantless search of checked
luggage belonging to suspected hijackers, because exi-
gent circumstances justified the search.2"5 Authorities
conducted the search for passenger identification, not
weapons, and the court recognized "the airborne passen-
ger's inability to fetch any weapon that might be con-
cealed in his checked baggage. "206 The court's opinion is
fully consistent with the following statement from the dis-
senting opinion of Judge Thornberry: "The screening
procedures prescribed by the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration are designed to thwart the carry-on threat and do
not provide for searching or magnetometer testing of
checked luggage .... This seems to indicate that the FAA
does not consider checked luggage to present a significant
skyjacking danger. 20 7
In Torres v. Puerto Rico 20 8 the United States Supreme
Court considered a Puerto Rican statute20 9 which author-
ized police to "inspect the luggage ... of passengers...
who land in the airports ...and search those persons
whom the Police have ground to suspect of illegally carry-
ing firearms. ' 21 0 The statute did not "require the police
to have probable cause to believe that they [would] find
contraband before they search[ed] baggage. 21 1 The
Supreme Court found that a search conducted under the
statute violated the fourth amendment.1 2
Based on the Torres precedent, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the right to bring an action for damages and to enjoin in-
trieval of checked baggage of "narcotics profile" passenger for warrantless search
violated the fourth amendment); United States v. Garay, 477 F.2d 1306, 1308 (5th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (warrantless search of suitcases violated fourth amend-
ment; government failed to sustain burden of demonstrating exception to warrant
requirement).
2- 484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 415 U.S. 902 (1974).
205 Id. at 515.
2- Id. at 514.
207 Id. at 518.
20. 442 U.S. 465 (1979).
2W P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 25 § 1051 (1979).
2- 442 U.S. at 466 n.l.
211 Id. at 467.
212 id. at 474.
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spections of baggage transported by air if plaintiffs could
show that "the asserted administrative need to search [for
plant quarantine purposes in this case] is simply a pre-
tense employed to justify a warrantless search for criminal
law enforcement purposes. '"213 At common law an illegal
search, whether committed by a government agent or pri-
vate person, gave rise to an action in trespass or other
appropriate tort action.2 14 Damages and injunctive relief
remain appropriate remedies for illegal searches and
seizures committed both by police2 1 5 and agents of com-
mon carriers acting in a quasi-official capacity.2 16
X-ray screening of carryon baggage for weapons is a
search under the fourth amendment, but is not unreason-
able because it serves to prevent hijackings.21 7 However,
an air carrier who locates its baggage check-in inside the
sterile area searches all baggage (including baggage to be
checked) for weapons at the x-ray screening point. Yet
the x-ray screening of non-carryon baggage, without pas-
senger consent, appears to violate the fourth
amendment. 218
The x-ray search of carryon baggage should be con-
ducted voluntarily and with the passenger's consent. Pas-
sengers, not skycaps, carry their own carryon baggage to
the x-ray device, where they see conspicuous warning
signs. They remain free to avoid this search by checking
their baggage. This freedom of choice does not exist for
passengers flying airlines who locate baggage check-in in-
side the sterile area, particularly when the procedure con-
fuses passengers or when the passengers use a sky cap to
213 Barusch v. Calvo, 685 F.2d 1199, 1200 (9th Cir. 1982).
214 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-29 (1886).
' ., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (action for damages against federal officers); Dorsey v.
Community Stores Corp., 346 F. Supp. 103, 105 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (injunction
against seizure).
2,, Nashville Cent. and St. Louis Ry. v. Crosby, 183 Ala. 237, 62 So. 889, 893
(1913) (damages for assault and illegal search by agent of common carrier).
217 See, e.g., United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972).
218 See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
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carry baggage they intend to check and they do not see
the warning signs in time.
2. Private and Border Searches of Checked Baggage
Consistent with the mandate that carriers adopt uni-
form procedures and screen carryon baggage, Congress
enacted 49 U.S.C. § 1511 to require air carriers to refuse
transportation of
(1) any person who does not consent to a search of his
person, as prescribed in section 1356(a) of this Appendix,
to determine whether he is unlawfully carrying a danger-
ous weapon, explosive, or other destructive substance, or
(2) any property of any person who does not consent to
a search or inspection of such property to determine
whether it unlawfully contains a dangerous weapon, ex-
plosive, or other destructive substance. 9
Subsection (b) goes on to provide that agreements to
transport property shall include the stipulation that car-
riage shall be refused if the passenger or shipper does not
give the described consent.220
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Rodriguez,22' refusing
to suppress narcotics seized by an air carrier, offers some
insight not found in the sparse legislative history of sec-
tion 1511:
The recently enacted federal statute which governs the
authority of air freight carriers to inspect parcels for dan-
gerous items does not convert the search from a private to
a governmental search. The new statute in fact limits the
carrier's private, common law authority to open packages.
The statute provides that any "agreement for the carriage
of... property.., by an air carrier.., shall be deemed to
include an agreement that such carriage shall be refused
when consent . . . to inspect such property . . . is not
given."
The new federal statute in no way expands this tradi-
2- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1511(a)(1982).
221, Id. at § 1511(b).
22 596 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1979).
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tional, common law authority of carriers to open and in-
spect packages. Indeed, it seems to limit this authority by
permitting inspection only after the shipper has been noti-
fied that the carrier might open the shipment.222
In a similar case involving narcotics seizures, United
States v. Gumerlock,22 3 the Ninth Circuit discussed the con-
nection between section 1511, requiring consent searches
of persons and property, and section 1356, requiring
screening of passengers and carryon baggage: "The
search referred to in subsection (a) of section [ 1511 ] is the
screening search required by [49 U.S.C. § 1356(a)] which,
as we have seen, is limited to passengers and their carryon
possessions.... 2 2 4 The court concluded that "Congress
did not intend to require that air freight shipments be
subjected to the security screening process mandated by
the government for passengers and their carryon
possessions."225
Although it does not refer to section 1511, United States
v. Freeland2 26 upheld a consent search of a bag to be
checked.227 A sign posted at the ticket counter stated that
one could withdraw the bag or refuse to board and that
checked baggage could be examined. 28 Freeland placed
his suitcase on the weight scale next to the ticket counter
to be checked through to his destination.229 Since he fit
the "hijacker profile" (paid in cash, one way ticket, no
identification), the agent told him his bag would have to
be x-rayed. 23 0 Freeland acquiesced without objection,
and the screening agents discovered a gun.23 The court
ruled the search to be private and consensual, upholding
the conviction for delivering a firearm to a common car-
222 Id. at 172-73.
22-, 590 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948 (1979).
224 Id. at 797.
2. id. at 796.
221 562 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 957 (1977).
227 Id. at 386.
2' Id. at 385.
229 Id. at 384.
230 Id.
241 Id.
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rier without written notice, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(e).232 The court did not explain how the passen-
ger's offering of the bag to be checked amounted to actual
delivery rather than tender for delivery without
acceptance.
In United States v. Keuylian 233 the Second Circuit upheld
x-ray screening of baggage checked through from Califor-
nia to Jordan, because the search was private.234 Twelve
handguns and two rifles had not been declared at check-
in, and the government charged defendant with a viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e).235 All checked luggage for Air
France going overseas was x-rayed.236 Police were called
when the firearms were seen with the x-ray.237 The court
stated, "Federal law ... does not mandate any screening
of checked luggage by Air France, much less x-raying of
such baggage. "238 The court noted that, according to an
FAA representative, "the x-ray screening of checked bag-
gage was not part of the formal security plan filed by Air
France with the F.A.A. and that as far as the relevant
F.A.A. guidelines were concerned Air France could dis-
continue x-raying checked luggage at any time. ' 23 9 This
made the search a private search not prohibited by the
fourth amendment.2 40
Screening checked baggage on international flights ap-
parently has been utilized for some time. The Second
Circuit in United States v. Edwards4 noted, "We are not
here required to and do not consider what circumstances
may justify the search of checked baggage, a procedure
routinely followed by at least some airlines on interna-
2-12 Id. at 384-86.
2-1 602 F.2d 1033 (2d. Cir. 1979).
2.4 Id. at 1034.
2.15 Id. at 1037. See infra notes 340-397 for a complete discussion of section
922(e).
2.,( Keuylian, 602 F.2d at 1037.
2.'7 Id.
2.4 Id. at 1040.
'241 Id.
240 Id.
241498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974).
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tional flights from the United States. ' 242  The x-ray
screening and physical search of a suspected firearms vio-
lator on a flight to Nigeria, revealing a dozen undeclared
revolvers, was upheld in United States v. Udofot 2 43 because
"it [fell] within the well-recognized 'border exception' to
the warrant requirements. 2 44
3. May the Right to Travel be Conditioned on
Consent to Search?
The right to travel2 45 and the right of privacy against
unreasonable searches and seizures 246 have long been re-
garded as fundamental. Several courts have addressed
the issue of whether or not consent to search may be re-
quired for air travel so as to make the search valid under
the fourth amendment. 47 The seminal opinion for the
majority rule on this issue appears in United States v. Lo-
pez. 248 The Lopez court stated, "Nor can the government
properly argue that it can condition the exercise of the
defendant's constitutional right to travel on the voluntary
relinquishment of his Fourth Amendment rights.... Im-
plied consent under such circumstances would be inher-
ently coercive. "249
242 Id. at 498 n.4.
243 711 F.2d 831 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 896 (1983).
244 Id. The "border search exception," which is premised upon the govern-
ment's sovereign authority to safeguard the nation's borders, "justifies a warrant-
less search without probable cause of persons crossing the United States border."
Id.
245 "There is hereby recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any citizen of
the United States a public right of freedom of transit through the navigable air-
space of the United States." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1304 (1982).
24(i The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
247 See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
218 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
2... Id. at 1093. Accord United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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Determining that the test should be the reasonableness
of the search and not consent to search, the Second Cir-
cuit in United States v. Albardo250 stated that while other
forms of transportation are often available, "it would
work a considerable hardship on many air travelers to be
forced to utilize an alternate form of transportation, as-
suming one exists at all."' 25' By analogy, if the govern-
ment tapped all telephones to counter kidnapping, public
knowledge of this procedure and the availability of alter-
nate means of communication would not show that one
consented to have a telephone tapped. The necessity of
flying on a commercial airliner should not coerce one into
waiving fourth amendment rights.252
Another opinion which argues that freedom to avoid
search in the air travel context amounts to no choice at all
appears in United States v. Davis 253 :
Although the right to travel is not absolute, and its scope
and limitations remain uncertain, it is firmly settled that
freedom to travel at home and abroad without unreasona-
ble governmental restriction is a fundamental constitu-
tional right of every American citizen. . . .Moreover,
exercise of the constitutional right to travel may not be
conditioned upon the relinquishment of another constitu-
tional right (here, the Fourth Amendment right to be free
of unreasonable search), absent a compelling state
interest.
254
Only the Fourth Circuit seems to have based a consent
to search theory on one's option not to travel by air. In
250 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974).
2-1 Id. at 807.
252 Id. at 807 n.14.
25s 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
I2 d. at 912-13. The court quotes Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
as follows:
"This court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal
Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to
require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by status, rules, or regulations
which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement."
Davis, 482 F.2d at 912 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629).
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United States v. DeAngelo, 25 '5 before noting that a passenger
voluntarily entered the screening process after passing by
warning signs, the court pointed out that he "had a choice
of traveling by air or by some other means. "256 This was
needless dictum, for the case involved a search of carryon
baggage and the passenger could have avoided the search
by checking the baggage in question without foregoing air
travel.
The rule adopted by most courts is that the search of
carryon baggage is not based on a coerced, subjective
consent. The net effect may be the same in that the same
baggage gets screened under either theory. Moreover,
the option of checking baggage is a very real choice which
minimizes interference with the right to travel without be-
ing searched.
4. Does Notice Make the Search Consensual?
Courts have divided on the question of whether or not
conspicuous notice of searches of carryon baggage and of
the person justifies the searches on the basis of consent.
Some courts have held that notice alone does not make
consent free and voluntary; others contend that it suf-
fices. 257 In United States v. Lopez 258 clearly observable signs
stated, "Passengers and Baggage Subject to Search. 25 9
In the court's view, the notice did not provide a basis for
finding implied consent, because "consent to search in-
volves a relinquishment of fundamental constitutional
rights and should not be lightly inferred. 260
United States v. Davis26 1 involved a pistol in a briefcase
submitted on request for inspection by a passenger run-
ning late for his flight. 26 2 The passenger, engaged in drug
2M 584 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979).
256 Id. at 47.
2-17 See infra notes 258-265 and accompanying text.
2-- 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
2.1 Id. at 1092.
2- Id. Accord United States v. Kroli, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973).
211, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
2' Id. at 896.
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rehabilitation work at the time, obtained the firearm for
self-protection after twice being exposed to sniper fire. 63
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the passenger exhibited
an actual expectation of privacy by relying "on the privacy
of his briefcase to conceal his gun. '264 Moreover, this ex-
pectation proved reasonable despite general notice of
searches at the airport:
This requirement does not mean that any kind of govern-
mental intrusion is permissible if it has occurred often
enough. The government could not avoid the restrictions
of the Fourth Amendment by notifying the public that all
telephone lines would be tapped, or that all homes would
be searched. "Airport searches" are not outside the
Amendment simply because they are being conducted at
all airports.26 5
The content of a warning notice may make a difference.
The Second Circuit noted in United States v. Ruiz-Estrella 266
that signs currently in use at most airports typically "do
not alert passengers to their ability to avoid search by re-
fusing to board. ' 267 In United States v. DeAngelo 268 the
263 Id. at 896 n.2.
264 Id. at 905. The court applied the two-pronged reasonable search test enun-
ciated in Katz v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Under
this test, a warrantless search contravenes the fourth amendment if (1) the de-
fendant exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) the defend-
ant's expectation is objectively reasonable. Id.
26- Davis, 482 F.2d at 905.
2- 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973).
267 Id. at 728 n.4. The Ruiz-Estrella court ultimately reversed the trial court's
denial of a motion to suppress a sawed-off shotgun seized from the defendant
after an airport search. Id. at 727-30. The government argued, inter alia, that the
search and seizure of the shotgun was "justified on the less-than-probable cause
standards of Terry v. Ohio [392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)]." Id. at 729. The court ac-
knowledged that their earlier opinion in United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 673-
74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972), employed a Terry rationale to justify
an airport seizure of narcotics from a suspect who met the "hijacker profile," acti-
vated a magnetometer, and admitted to officials on the scene that he had just been
released on bail for attempted murder and narcotics charges. Ruiz-Estrella, 481
F.2d at 729. The court found the Bell case distinguishable from the situation at
hand, in which the defendant "neither passed through nor activated a magnetom-
eter, and . . . did nothing at all during the period in question that could be con-
strued as suspicious in nature" (although the defendant did fit the "hijacker
profile"). Id. See infra notes 275-286 for a discussion of the Terry "stop and frisk"
doctrine and the applicability vel non of that doctrine in an airport setting.
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warning signs stated, "X-RAY BAGGAGE INSPECTION.
CARRY ON BAGGAGE IS BEING INSPECTED BY X-
RAY. . . . PHYSICAL INSPECTION MAY BE RE-
QUESTED. ' 269 When the defendant submitted his brief-
case for inspection and the x-ray screen showed a
suspicious object, security officers opened the briefcase
over defendant's objection and found drugs. 270  The
Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction on the following
grounds:
DeAngelo had a choice of traveling by air or by some
other means. The signs in the terminal gave him fair no-
tice that if in [the] course of the total screening process a
physical inspection of his hand baggage should be consid-
ered necessary to assure the safety of the traveling public,
he could be required to submit it for that purpose. When
he then voluntarily entered upon the screening process
DeAngelo acquiesced in its full potential scope as repre-
sented to him.... We therefore conclude that having con-
sented to the search, DeAngelo could not withhold
permission after the first step of the process disclosed that
he was attempting to carry aboard the aircraft articles that
were concealed from x-ray. 2
71
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the extent to
which the posting of notice effects consent for the search
of luggage. However, in Florida v. Royer,272 the Court sup-
pressed evidence obtained from a search of checked air-
line luggage.273 A plurality of the Court noted that
"where the validity of the search rests on consent, the
State has the burden of proving that the necessary con-
268 484 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979).
2-9 Id. at 49.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 47-48. United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1980), involved
more than just signs. In Haynie the defendant "voluntarily entered the screening
process," and his "repeated expressions of his desire to be admitted to the board-
ing area through a security check point employing an x-ray scanner [could not] be
construed as other than a knowing consent to the full scope of the search con-
ducted." Id. at 230.
272 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion).
27.1 Id. at 497.
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sent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily
given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere
submission to a claim of lawful authority. ' 274 In sum, the
mere posting of a sign should be considered insufficient,
without more, to show consent. Contrariwise, the ab-
sence of conspicuous notice may be one circumstance in-
dicating lack of consent.
5. Withdrawal From the Search
A passenger may begin a search process and then with-
draw. When this occurs, courts have been unable to agree
on the extent to which suspicious conduct warrants a stop
and frisk.275 In United States v. Epperson276 passengers were
screened by a magnetometer. This minimal invasion of
privacy was justified "for the sole purpose of discovering
weapons and preventing air piracy. '2 77 The magnetome-
ter disclosed an unusually high reading on the defend-
ant. 278 The air marshal asked him if he was carrying a
large amount of metal, and the defendant produced sev-
eral metal objects, but still gave a positive reading on the
magnetometer. 9  The marshal then frisked the defend-
ant and found a pistol.2 80 The Fourth Circuit found the
frisk reasonable under the Supreme Court's 1968 ruling
in Terry v. Ohio.28 '
Rejecting the Epperson reasoning, the district court in
274 Id. Justice Brennan concurred in the decision to suppress, but believed the
initial stop was illegal and that it was not necessary to address the consent issue.
See id. at 509-13.
275 See infra notes 276-286 and accompanying text. See also supra note 267.
270 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
277 Id. at 771.
278 Id. at 770.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 772 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). The Teiry opinion
held that the fourth amendment does not forbid limited "stop and frisk" proce-
dures without a warrant or probable cause, if the officer making the stop has a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and that the
defendant poses a threat to the safety of the officer or others nearby. See 392 U.S.
at 25-27.
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United States v. Meulener 28 2 pointed out that about half of
all passengers activate the magnetometer, and that even a
nail file will trigger it.2 83 Recognizing that if a passenger
who activated the magnetometer did not board the plane
he could be of no danger to the flight, the court held, "To
meet Fourth Amendment guarantees, the prospective pas-
senger must be advised that he has to submit to a search if
he wants to board the plane, but that he can decline to be
searched if he chooses not to board the aircraft. ' 284
The Terry rationale has no application to airport
searches unless specific articulable facts establish reason-
able cause to believe one is armed and about to commit a
crime.2 85 As the Ninth Circuit noted in Davis, "There is
no reason to believe that the incidence of concealed weap-
ons is greater among airline passengers than among
members of the public generally, and Terry does not jus-
tify the wholesale 'frisking' of the general public in order
to locate weapons and prevent future crimes. '"286
The above cases maybe reconciled by emphasizing the
requirement of articulable facts. The Ninth Circuit noted
in United States v. Homburg28 7 that "a party may revoke his
consent to be searched any time prior to boarding the
plane, even when he has passed beyond the initial screen-
ing point, if he agrees to leave the boarding area. "288
Although the passenger in Homburg indicated a desire to
leave the boarding area rather than submit to a warrant-
less search, the security officers detained the passenger
and proceeded to search his suitcase. 28 9 To determine the
282 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
28- Id. at 1289.
I2 Id. at 1289-90. Accord United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D.
Cal. 1972) (airline may require search as a condition to board, but "a passenger
must be aware of his option to avoid the search by not boarding.").
285 See, e.g., Davis, 482 F.2d at 907. But see Bell, 464 F.2d at 674-75 (Friendly, J.,
concurring and suggesting that airport security concerns alone justify limited air-
port searches conducted on a less-than-probable cause basis, even in the absence
of the articulable suspicion otherwise required by Terry).
286 Id. at 907-08.
287 546 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977).
28 Id. at 1352.
289 Id.
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reasonableness of the search, the court employed a bal-
ancing of interests approach similar to the approach taken
in Terry.290 As in Terry, the facts in Homburg evidenced a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant
posed an immediate threat to others nearby. He acted in
a highly suspicious and nervous manner, he attempted to
conceal a rectangular bulge in his trousers, he disap-
peared into a restroom for several minutes, and authori-
ties had recently received an anonymous bomb threat. 291
These factors gave the government a legitimate and com-
pelling interest which outweighed the individual passen-
ger's right to privacy from the search in question. 292
The Davis opinion perhaps summarizes best the manner
in which airport searches may be reconciled with the
fourth amendment. After reviewing the various theories
set forth to justify the searches, the court concluded,
These doctrines dictate a critical examination of each el-
ement of the airport security program to make certain that
neither the passenger's right to travel nor his right to per-
sonal privacy is burdened beyond the clear necessities of
current circumstances.
As we have seen, however, the need for some limitations
upon these rights is clear. In light of that need, a screen-
ing of passengers and of the articles that will be accessible
to them in flight does not exceed constitutional limitations
provided that the screening process is no more extensive
nor intensive than necessary, in the light of current tech-
nology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives,
that it is confined in good faith to that purpose, and that
potential passengers may avoid the search by electing not
to fly. 29
3
20 See id. at 1351-52.
291 id. at 1353.
212 See id. at 1353.
29. 482 F.2d at 913.
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IV. FAA REGULATIONS ON CARRIAGE OF FIREARMS AND
SCREENING OF BAGGAGE
Federal regulations concerning screening procedures
and transportation of firearms appear in parts 107 and
108 of the Code of Federal Regulations.294 These regula-
tions prescribe security procedures at three stages: bag-
gage check-in, entry into the sterile area (which includes
the x-ray of carryon baggage), and behavior aboard the
aircraft.29 5 Each air carrier must conduct screening "to
prevent or deter the carriage aboard airplanes of any ex-
plosive, incendiary device, or a deadly or dangerous
weapon on or about each individual's person or accessible
property, and the carriage of any explosive or incendiary
device in checked baggage. ' 296 The regulations conspicu-
ously omit authorization for screening checked baggage
for weapons, since weapons are not accessible in flight.
A. The Carriage of Unloaded Firearms in Checked Baggage
The screening process begins at the area generally
known as the ticket counter where passengers present
non-carryon baggage for check-in. 14 C.F.R. § 108.11(d)
provides,
No certificate holder [i.e., commercial airline] may know-
ingly permit any person to transport, nor may any person
transport or tender for transport, any unloaded firearm in
checked baggage aboard an airplane unless -
(1) The passenger declares to the certificate holder,
either orally or in writing before checking the baggage,
that any firearm carried in the baggage is unloaded;
(2) The firearm is carried in a container the certificate
holder considers appropriate for air transportation;
(3) When the firearm is other than a shotgun, rifle, or
other firearm normally fired from the shoulder position,
the baggage in which it is carried is locked, and only the
2- 14 C.F.R. §§ 107-08 (1986).
29.5 See id.
2- 14 C.F.R. § 108.9(a).
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passenger checking the baggage retains the key or combi-
nation; and
(4) The baggage containing the firearm is carried in an
area, other than the flightcrew compartment, that is inac-
cessible to passengers. 297
When rulemakers first proposed this subsection it did
not contain the word "knowingly," leading to the objec-
tion that "since the prohibition would apply even if the
certificate holder did not have knowledge of the existence
of a weapon in checked baggage, it would necessitate a
search by the certificate holder of every piece of checked
baggage offered for air carriage. ' 29 The FAA deleted
"knowingly" because "[i]t was not the intent of the pro-
posed regulation to require a search of every article of
baggage checked for carriage. "299
The "declaration" of a firearm "may consist of an oral
or written statement, whichever the certificate holder
deems appropriate. '3 0 0 The FAA rejected a proposal that
airlines inspect firearms to ensure that they are unloaded,
agreeing that "it is more dangerous for the certificate
holder to determine whether a gun is loaded, especially in
the event that an employee of the certificate holder who is
297 Id. at § 108.11 (d).
298 40 Fed. Reg. 17,552 (1975).
2 Id.
3- 42 Fed. Reg. 42,874-75 (1977). In practice, most airlines have the passenger
sign a bright orange tag declaring that the firearm is unloaded. An agent or the
passenger places this tag on the baggage handle or inside the baggage. Placing
the tag on the outside discloses the contents, thereby encouraging theft of the
firearms and discouraging passengers from declaring them. Current Petition for
Rulemaking, Docket No. 24969, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,600 (May 21, 1986) would pro-
hibit air carriers from placing such tags on the outside of baggage. The Domestic
Mail Manual, section 124.56, provides a similar rule. Airlines have been sued for
negligence following the theft of tagged baggage. E.g., Randall v. Frontier Air-
lines, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ark. 1975). It is well-established in common
law that firearms may constitute "baggage" which a common carrier has a duty to
transport and deliver back to the traveler undamaged. See, e.g., Little Rock and
H.S.W. Ry. Co. v. Record, 74 Ark. 125, -, 85 S.W. 421, 423 (1905) (trial court
properly submitted question to jury as to whether shotguns were "baggage," and
court did not err by entering judgment for plaintiffon an affirmative jury response
to this question); Woods v. Devin, 13 Ill. 746, 747-51 (1852) (common carrier
held liable for loss of carpet-bag containing a pocket pistol and a pair of dueling
pistols).
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unfamiliar with the use of firearms must perform the
check, than it is to carry a loaded gun in checked
baggage. "301
The regulation also requires that the container be ap-
proved as appropriate for air transportation. "It is the
opinion of the FAA that requiring firearms to be carried
in appropriate containers will reduce the likelihood of any
loaded firearm in checked baggage discharging and caus-
ing serious injury to personnel of the certificate holder or
to passengers. 30 2 Originally, all firearms had to be car-
ried in locked containers, but the FAA deleted this re-
quirement for shoulder weapons because "containers for
firearms such as shotguns and rifles are frequently not
equipped with locking devices and are difficult to lock in
any other manner. Furthermore, they are not easily con-
cealed and do not constitute a significant hazard to safety
in air commerce. 30 3
Ammunition also may be transported in checked bag-
gage. Regulations on transportation of hazardous materi-
als do not apply to "[simall-arms ammunition for
personal use carried by a crewmember or passenger in his
baggage (excluding carry-on baggage) if securely packed
in fiber, wood, or metal boxes. 30 4
Small-arms ammunition must be packed in pasteboard or
other inside boxes, or in partitions designed to fit snugly
in the outside container, or must be packed in metal clips.
The partitions and metal clips must be so designed as to
protect the primers from accidental injury. The inside
boxes, partitions and metal clips must be packed in se-
curely closed strong outside wooden or fiberboard boxes
305or metal containers.
so, 40 Fed. Reg. 17,552 (1975).
102 43 Fed. Reg. 11,976 (1978).
30. 42 Fed. Reg. 42,875 (1977).
49 C.F.R. § 175.10(a)(5) (1985). Small arms ammunition includes a fixed
metallic, plastic, or paper cartridge case with a primer and propelling charge, with
or without a bullet, shot, or other projectile. Id. at § 173.100(b).
3.3 Id. at § 173.101(a). See id. at §§ 173.101(b)-(e), 173.107 (primers, primed
cases, and percussion caps must be packed in the partitions and secured against
movement to prevent an explosion of one portion from exploding others). Rules
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B. The Prohibition on Loaded Firearms
14 C.F.R. § 108.11(c) provides,
No certificate holder may knowingly permit any person to
transport, nor may any person transport or tender for
transport .... a loaded firearm in checked baggage aboard
an airplane. For the purpose of this section, a loaded fire-
arm means a firearm which has a live round of ammuni-
tion, cartridge, detonator, or powder in the chamber or in
a clip, magazine, or cylinder inserted in it.3 0 6
The definition of loaded firearm was added "to ensure
that the intent of [the section] is clear," for "there are ap-
parently some members of the public who do not inter-
pret 'loaded' to include ammunition in a magazine or clip
inserted into the weapon. "307
Many people do not consider a semi-automatic pistol
"loaded" if it has ammunition in the magazine or clip, but
no cartridge in the chamber. Unless one pulls the slide
back manually and releases it to insert a cartridge into the
chamber, the pistol will not discharge either purposefully
or accidentally, if in proper working condition. Accord-
ingly, the FAA proposed a rule "to require the certificate
holder to notify passengers with firearms in checked bag-
gage of the definition contained in Section [108.11(c)].
This notification should help to eliminate uncertainty on
the part of the public about what constitutes a loaded
weapon for the purpose of this regulation. ' 30 8 The FAA
and the industry apparently recognized that, despite the
formal definition of "loaded," a magazine with ammuni-
tion inserted into a pistol without a cartridge in the cham-
ber does not present a real hazard to safety. The FAA
withdrew the proposed rule with this comment: "Inas-
much as there is no evidence indicating a need for this
added provision, and its implementation would impose an
for carriage of arms and ammunition are summarized in FAA, ADVISORY CIRCULAR
108-2, SECURITY RULES - CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS AND ESCORTED PERSONS (1981).
.... 14 C.F.R. § 108.11(c) (1986).
45 Fed. Reg. 13,059 (1980).
Id. at 80,453.
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additional unnecessary cost on certificate holders, this
proposal is withdrawn. 3 0 9
C. Firearms in the Sterile Area and Beyond
Baggage check-in is an essential first step of the uni-
form screening procedure, for it dispossesses passengers
of weapons in checked baggage. After check-in occurs, a
passenger may proceed to the second step. 14 C.F.R.
§ 107.12(a) provides that "no person may have a deadly
or dangerous weapon.., on or about the individual's per-
son or accessible property - (1) when performance has
begun of the inspection of the individual's person or ac-
cessible property before entering a sterile area; and (2)
when entering or in a sterile area. ' 31 0 Violation of this
regulation constitutes a civil, not a criminal, offense.3 1 '
Prohibited weapons include firearms and "such items as
mace and certain knives. '3 1 2
As originally proposed, section 107.21(a) would have
made it a federal violation for a person anywhere in an
airport to have any weapon on or about his person or
property in violation of any applicable state or local
law. 13 Commenters objected that local laws already han-
dled these situations adequately, that the wide variance in
the laws would lead to lack of uniformity and would be
unfair to unknowing passengers, that the FAA role should
be limited to the terminal, and that "sterile" airports were
unrealistic.3 1 4 The FAA also concluded that it was unnec-
essary to make a state or local violation a federal violation
as well:
The FAA agrees that the only place on the airport
where, as a practical matter, illegal firearms, explosives, or
incendiary devices in a person's possession are likely to be
3- 47 Fed. Reg. 13,314 (1982).
slo 14 C.F.R. § 107.21(a) (1986) (as amended by an FAA final rule at 51 Fed.
Reg. 1351 (Jan. 10, 1986)).
It, See 51 Fed. Reg. 1350 (1986).
-12 Id. at 1351.
- See 43 Fed. Reg. 60,791 (1978).
314 Id.
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discovered is at the passenger screening point. Further,
should a weapon be found at a point on the airport other
than the screening point or within a sterile area, it would
remain subject to any local laws prohibiting or limiting the
carriage of weapons....
For these reasons, the FAA has modified this section by
prohibiting unauthorized carriage of firearms, explosives,
or incendiary devices by persons in or entering sterile ar-
eas or presenting themselves for inspection at established
passenger screening points. It should be noted that the
rule does not prohibit the legal carriage of firearms for
sporting or other purposes when those firearms are not
accessible to unauthorized persons in a sterile area.3" 5
A few commenters objected that a prohibition of firearms
even in the sterile area violated the right to keep and bear
arms and the right to protect oneself. The FAA concluded
that "while the Second Amendment protects the right of
the people to bear arms, it does not confer an absolute
right on the individual to carry a weapon at all times and
in all places. 3 1 6
The purpose of creating a sterile area was to enforce a
much older rule, the prohibition on possession of an ac-
cessible weapon in the airplane itself. 14 C.F.R.
§ 108.11 (a) provides,
No certificate holder required to conduct screening under
a security program may permit any person to have, nor
may any person have, on or about his or her person or
property, a deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed
or unconcealed, accessible to him or her while aboard an
airplane for which screening is required ....
D. X-Ray Screening of Baggage
From the beginning of the airport screening program,
only carryon items-"briefcases, purses, coats, etc. '31 8
3"Id.
31, Id.
$1 14 C.F.R. § 108.11(a) (1986).
118 FAA, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIVIL
AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM 5 (Jan. - July 1975).
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have been subject to routine screening. In 1971 the FAA
first issued its rulemaking notice to require airlines to
adopt procedures to "prevent or deter the carriage
aboard its aircraft of any sabotage device or weapon in
carry-on baggage or on or about the persons of passen-
gers. ' 31 9  In 1974 the FAA issued an emergency order
that required x-ray screening of all carryon baggage.3 20
Cognizant of fourth amendment concerns, however, the
government forbade airlines from "using an X-ray system
to inspect carry-on baggage or items, unless there is a sign
posted in a conspicuous place which notifies passengers
that such baggage and [its contents] are being inspected
by an X-ray system."13 2 ' The FAA noted in 1986 that "for
the most part, the general public now accepts the screen-
ing of their person and carryon articles as a minor
inconvenience."3 22
After a bomb exploded at La Guardia airport leaving
eleven persons dead and dozens wounded, the FAA re-
quired airlines to screen checked baggage for explosives
or incendiary devices.32 3 Particular methods of screening
(e.g., random dog sniffing or mechanical devices) are not
mandated by regulation. 24 Baggage entering into the
-9 36 Fed. Reg. 19,174 (1971).
320 39 Fed. Reg. 22,275 (1974).
321 Id.
322 51 Fed. Reg. 1350 (1986).
323 41 Fed. Reg. 10,911 (1976). After the first six months of such screening, the
FAA reported, "Although no explosive devices have been found, a number of
apparent criminal acts have been uncovered. Examples include detection of a
large sum of currency and a stolen gun and varying amounts of narcotics in
checked baggage identified in the screening process." FAA, SEMIANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM 14
(Jan. -July 1976). Fourth amendment concerns are immediately apparent.
324 Dog/handler teams are most efficient at explosive detection. "To date in
actual detection missions, the canine teams have detected 48 explosive items in
the course of 6,477 aircraft and airport searches." FAA, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM 16(Jan. -July 1982).
Research and development for detection in checked baggage continues with (1)
x-ray absorption detection (performance "somewhat less than anticipated"), (2)
thermal neutron activation (time consuming so more suitable for air cargo), and
(3) nuclear magnetic resonance (tested and feasible). A walk-by explosive detec-
tor checks for explosives on individuals by vapor collection. Id. at 17-18.
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sterile area undergoes screening via "cabinet X-ray sys-
tems designed primarily for the inspection of carry-on
baggage.'325 These x-ray systems must be designed to
meet very specific technical requirements. 2 6
Federal statutory language referring to the "duty rest-
ing upon air carriers to perform their services with the
highest possible degree of safety in the public interest, '32 7
restates the common-law duty of common carriers.
"Under the statute and regulations, an airline has at least
a duty to conduct searches of the carry-on baggage of
boarding passengers with the highest possible degree of
care, and to prevent the carrying aboard of unauthorized
weapons where such prevention can reasonably be
achieved.' '328
Despite the fact that x-ray systems are designed to
screen carryon baggage, the FAA amended 14 C.F.R.
§ 108.17(a) in 1986 to permit airlines to use x-ray systems
to screen checked baggage as well. 329  A new subsection
adds, "No certificate holder may use an X-ray system to
inspect carry-on or checked articles unless a sign is posted
in a conspicuous place at the screening station and on the
X-ray system which notifies passengers that such items are
being inspected by an X-ray .... -330 This marks the first
time the FAA has explicitly authorized use of x-ray sys-
tems to screen checked baggage without limiting the
scope of the search to explosives or incendiary devices -
i.e., the new rule could be read to permit a search for fire-
arms or other weapons in checked baggage. The an-
nouncement of the rule failed to discuss the purpose of x-
raying checked baggage, and failed to address its effec-
125 14 C.F.R. §§ 108.17(a)(1), (2) (1986).
3-12 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 1020.40(a), (b)(3), (c)(10) (1986).
327 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421 (1982).
'8 United States v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 795, 798 (E.D. Mo.
1976). In Ozark the court found the airline negligent for failure to detect a pistol
in a carryon bag. Id. at 799.
329 14 C.F.R. § 108.17(a) (1986). The rule now provides that certificate holders
may "use X-ray systems for inspecting carryon or checked articles under an ap-
proved security program." Id.
,O Id. at § 108.17(e).
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tiveness in view of the fact that existing x-ray systems are
designed to screen carryon baggage.3
Some commenters proposed that the signs required by
the rule not only should be posted in a conspicuous place,
"but also at or near the x-ray systems and at the checked
baggage stations as well."' 3 32 Another commenter recom-
mended that "the FAA should allow the use of X-ray sys-
tems at any location as long as they meet the current
imaging requirements. ' 338 In response, the FAA asserted
its belief that "the regulation should continue to require
only that the sign be 'posted in a conspicuous place.' It
will continue to consider what locations are appropriate
and so advise the air carrier. " 334
Posting signs in conspicuous places has important
fourth amendment overtones because the signs advise
passengers that a search will take place. This notice may
be an element in establishing the passenger's consent to
search.35 However, a notice against possession of fire-
arms is not "posted in a conspicuous place" if one cannot
see the notice until one already has violated the law.336
The author submits that government-authorized x-ray
searches of checked baggage for explosives or incendiary
devices do not encroach upon individual fourth amend-
ment rights, at least in the absence of less intrusive alter-
"' The notice of proposed rulemaking that preceded the new rule indicated
simply that FAA sought
to extend application of Sections 108.17 and 129.26 to checked bag-
gage as well as carry-on items since certificate holders from time to
time utilize imaging X-ray systems to inspect checked baggage. The
proposed amendment will require the air carriers to apply the rules
which up to now they have been following voluntarily when using X-
ray systems to process checked baggage.
49 Fed. Reg. 24,975 (1984).
13 50 Fed. Reg. 26,655 (1985). This comment came from a group of film man-
ufacturers and photographers who urged that without effective notice, passengers
with cameras might inadvertently expose their film to harmful x-rays. See id.
.533 Id.
3.44 Id.
" See supra notes 257-274 and accompanying text.
• United States v. Strakoff, 719 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1983) ("conspic-
uous place" means a place reasonably calculated to import the prohibitions of the
notice).
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natives (e.g., sniffing dogs), as long as the passenger
receives conspicuous notice that his checked baggage may
be searched for explosives or incendiary devices. On the
other hand, if the screening of checked baggage involves a
search for weapons which could not be used in a hijacking
because packed in checked baggage, the search clearly vi-
olates the fourth amendment.
The FAA perhaps adopted the new rule to authorize x-
ray screening of baggage intended to be checked and en-
tering the sterile area because one airline maintains no
area to check baggage before x-ray screening of carryon
baggage. 7 But such an arrangement presents a dilemma
for passengers who travel with firearms in baggage they
intend to check, particularly when they use a skycap to
carry their baggage, because they do not receive conspic-
uous notice at an x-ray system set up for use before rather
than after the baggage check-in counter. Fourth amend-
ment concerns clearly arise if the recent FAA authoriza-
tion to screen checked baggage is intended to sanction
the screening of all baggage for weapons. For security
reasons as well as fourth amendment reasons, the FAA in-
stead should require all airlines to maintain a separate
area to check baggage, and this checked baggage area
should be located ahead of the screening area for carryon
items.
An airline cannot conduct searches of carryon baggage
with the highest possible standard of care when it
searches all baggage with x-ray systems designed only for
carryon baggage. Screening all baggage at the sterile area
checkpoint obviously increases the volume of baggage
screened, and adds an element of confusion that of neces-
sity will detract from the thoroughness of the check and
will increase the window of opportunity to a potential hi-
jacker who does seek to smuggle a weapon aboard an air-
craft. Having a baggage check-in area before the x-ray
allows passengers with weapons in baggage to check them
."7 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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for carriage in an inaccessible part of the aircraft, as con-
templated by 14 C.F.R. § 108.11(d).3 3 8 "Depriving pas-
sengers of weapons is critical because it is only through
possession of a weapon on board a plane in flight that a
person can be a hijacker . . . . 339 Not having a baggage
check-in area before the x-ray increases the likelihood that
some passengers will not be deprived of weapons before
passing through the x-ray, and that weapons which go un-
detected into the sterile area will then be used for air
piracy or other criminal acts.
In the interests of both the fourth amendment and air
safety, the recent FAA authorization to screen checked
baggage by x-ray should be interpreted to authorize x-ray
screening only of baggage that already has been checked
and even then the search should be limited to explosives
or incendiary devices. The new FAA rule should not be
interpreted to permit x-ray screening of baggage intended
to be checked, at the entrance to the sterile area where
only carryon baggage should be allowed.
V. TRANSPORTATION OF FIREARMS BY AIR CARRIER
UNDER THE GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968
The Gun Control Act of 1968340 includes the following
provision concerning the shipment of firearms by com-
mon carriers:
(e) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to de-
liver or cause to be delivered to any common or contract
carrier for transportation or shipment in interstate or for-
eign commerce, to persons other than licensed importers,
licensed manufacturers, licensed dealers, or licensed col-
lectors, any package or other container in which there is
any firearm or ammunition without written notice to the
carrier that such firearm or ammunition is being trans-
ported or shipped; except that any passenger who owns or
legally possesses a firearm or ammunition being trans-
" 14 C.F.R. § 108.11(d) (1986).
•' State v. Salit, 613 P.2d 245, 250 (Alaska 1980).
.44 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-70 (1982).
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ported aboard any common or contract carrier for move-
ment with the passenger in interstate or foreign commerce
may deliver said firearm or ammunition into the custody
of the pilot, captain, conductor or operator of such com-
mon or contract carrier for the duration of the trip without
violating any of the provisions of this chapter.
(f) It shall be unlawful for any common or contract car-
rier to transport or deliver in interstate or foreign com-
merce any firearm or ammunition with knowledge or
reasonable cause to believe that the shipment, transporta-
tion, or receipt thereof would be in violation of the provi-
sions of this chapter.3 4'
A. The Passenger Exception in the Framer's Intent
The exception for passengers did not exist in the origi-
nal bill reported out of committee. The House report ex-
plained the original bill:
Section 922(e)-This subsection makes it unlawful
knowingly to deliver to a common or contract carrier any
package or other container in which there is a firearm or
ammunition, without written notice to the carrier that
such firearm or ammunition is being transported or
shipped. This provision is designed to make more effec-
tive the succeeding subsection which prohibits a carrier
from transporting or delivering a firearm in violation of
the chapter.
Section 922(0-This subsection makes it unlawful for a
common or contract carrier to transport or deliver any
firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce
with knowledge that its transportation or receipt would be
in violation of any provision of the chapter. It is the same
as existing law except that it covers all ammunition.14 2
Because the passenger exception was not in the bill as
reported, the above committee report contains no expla-
nation of the exception and may not be good authority
-4 Id. at § 922(e)-(f).
- H.R. REP. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4410-21 (subsections relettered to conform to statute as
codified).
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now that the section has been modified. Congressman
Howard Pollock of Alaska, who introduced the amend-
ment for a passenger exception, pointed out on the
House floor that Congress conducted no hearings on the
original bill to express the committee's understanding.
An opponent of the bill, Pollock did express his concerns:
"We have had some meaningful freedom to keep and bear
arms under the Constitution of the United States for
something like 192 years, but crime has gotten out of
hand only in the last 7 or 8 years. '3 43  Advocating state
enforcement rather than federal legislation, he argued
that "[n]o matter how we slice this evil piece of cake, the
bill does infringe on the right of the citizens to keep and
bear arms. 3 44 He noted that Alaskans have the highest
rate of firearms ownership in the nation and that they fre-
quently travel by air carrier with firearms for hunting. 45
Indeed, Pollock noted that he and other colleagues trans-
ported firearms by air to and from Washington, D.C. and
their home states:
There is a question that has been asked several times
today, as to whether this legislation would allow an owner
to transport firearms and ammunition in interstate
commerce.
I think the bill is absolutely silent on that matter, and it
does not cover this relatively common occurrence in one
way or the other. This should certainly be covered by an
amendment.3 46
Accordingly, Congressman Pollock offered the passen-
ger exception amendment worded precisely as passed. 47
Pollock offered the only explanation of the amendment:
Mr. Chairman, my amendment is simple and self-ex-
planatory. It provides clarification in yet another area of
the pending bill which is otherwise silent. The amend-




.47 See id. at 23,088.
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ment makes it clear that a person traveling by commercial
carrier to another State may lawfully transport his firearm
and ammunition with him by placing them in the custody
of the pilot, captain, conductor, or operator of the inter-
348state common carrier.
As amended, section 922(e) of the Gun Control Act in-
cludes two parts. First, one may not deliver to a common
carrier "any package or other container in which there is
any firearm or ammunition without written notice to the
carrier., 349 Congress obviously used the terms "package
or other container" because one normally delivers items
to be shipped in packages or other containers. No one
would deliver a firearm to a carrier with nothing but an
address tag on it and without packing it securely to avoid
damage.
Second, a passenger transporting a firearm "may de-
liver said firearm or ammunition into the custody of the
pilot" or other agent of the carrier without violating the
statute.50 Congress probably chose not to repeat the
phrase "package or other container" here because some
passengers, particularly police, security guards, or per-
sons with pistol-carry permits, would arrive with the fire-
arm in a holster on their person and not have a package
for it. Indeed, in the many states which do not prohibit
carrying firearms on the person, anyone could walk right
into a terminal with an unpackaged firearm and check it
for air shipment. 5 ' Since one cannot legally board an air-
craft with the firearm on his person, the exception allows
the passenger to deliver the firearm to the common car-
rier for shipment, regardless of whether it is packaged on
arrival at the airport.
Conspicuously absent from section 922(e) is any re-
quirement that the passenger notify the carrier that any
:148 Id.
149 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) (1982).
350 Id.
:1. Most airlines rent or sell containers for firearms to passengers who do not
have containers.
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package contains a firearm. The passenger "delivers" the
firearm to the carrier merely by transferring custody of it
for the duration of the trip. Had Congress intended to
require a declaration to discourage transport of personal
firearms into states where possession thereof would be il-
legal, it simply could have prohibited such transportation,
whether by private vehicle or common carrier.
An opponent of the overall bill, Congressman Pollock
probably would not have supported a requirement that
passengers declare orally or in writing that a package de-
livered to the carrier contains a firearm. In 1968 the law
did not require passengers of common carriers to declare
firearms, and it is clear from Pollock's comments that he
did not intend to make the requirements more stringent.
The FAA eventually promulgated a rule in 1975 that re-
quires an oral declaration that a firearm in baggage is un-
loaded, but even under this rule failure to declare remains
a mere civil violation.352
B. Judicial Construction
In a memorandum dated March 28, 1972, the Acting
Director of the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Legal Di-
vision advised the Regional Counsel of the Midwest Re-
gion of the agency's construction of section 922(e) as
follows:
We concur with the conclusions which your memoran-
dum sets forth. You correctly point out that a passenger
aboard a common or contract carrier who possesses a fire-
arm on his person would not fall within the proscriptions
of the statute since there would be no delivery. The legis-
lative history of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (House Re-
port no. 1577,June 21, 1968, 3 U.S. Cong. Admin. News
'68 4410, 4420), relates that this provision is designed to
make more effective the succeeding subsection which pro-
hibits a carrier from transporting or delivering a firearm in
violation of Chapter 44, Title 18. The possession of a fire-
arm by a passenger would not offend that subsection.
-. 40 Fed. Reg. 17,552 (1975).
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As you indicate, a passenger may, of course, like a
nonpassenger, deliver a package containing a firearm to
the carrier for shipment. In such event, he may give the
written notice required of a nonpassenger, or he may de-
liver the firearm or ammunition to the pilot, captain, con-
ductor, or operator of the carrier for the duration of the
trip. The statute does not require the passenger following
the second alternative to advise the operator, etc. that the
article being delivered is a firearm. Thus, it may well be
that the operator will unwittingly receive from the passen-
ger luggage containing a firearm. However, such delivery
is specifically excluded from the prohibitions of the sub-
section. We do not believe the Act can be broadened by
contending that the intent of Congress was otherwise.
We also concur that the Government would not be suc-
cessful in contending that the term "operator" does not
include the agency itself, i.e., railroad, airline, etc. There-
fore, we think you are correct in concluding that a passen-
ger who checked his luggage with the baggage agent of
the carrier would be in compliance with the section. 353
The first judicial construction of section 922(e) also
took place in 1972 in the Midwest Region. United States v.
Burton354 involved a passenger who in January 1972
checked a suitcase containing a loaded revolver with an
airline, giving no oral or written statement about the fire-
arm to the agent.355 The United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri agreed that section
922(e) does not impose "stringent reporting require-
ments" for persons traveling with firearms, "most note-
worthy of which is the hunter desiring to transport a
weapon in furtherance of the sport. ' 35 6 But the court
-3 Memorandum from Acting Director, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Legal
Division, to Regional Counsel, Midwest Region (Mar. 28, 1972).
3-4 351 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aft'don other grounds, 475 F.2d 469 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 835 (1973).
-5 Id. at 1374. The Eighth Circuit in Burton upheld the search and seizure be-
cause "the Braniff agent conducted the search entirely on his own" without gov-
ernment sanction or participation. 475 F.2d at 471. The agent believed the
defendant fit the "hijacker profile," and the weight distribution in one bag seemed
unusual; he opened the bag and found the revolver. Id. at 470.
-- Burton, 351 F. Supp. at 1377.
666 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
then compared the statutory written notice requirement
for shipment of "any package or other container in which
there is any firearm or ammunition, ' 35 7 to the exception
for the passenger who "may deliver saidfirearm or ammuni-
tion into the custody of the pilot. 35 8 The court concluded
that "[t]he failure of the statute to allow a passenger to
deliver the container instead of the firearm itself to certain
designated persons is obvious. ' 35 9 The court ignored the
argument that the firearm is indeed "delivered" when
checked with the airline in a suitcase.3 60
The Fourth Circuit adopted the Burton reasoning in
United States v. Williams,36 ' and suggested that the contrary
view would allow a dealer to "ship any quantity of fire-
arms and ammunition in sealed containers and evade the
requirement of written notice by the simple expedient of
flying as a passenger and carrying containers as lug-
gage. ' 36 2 The court's argument overlooks the fact that
the dealer could be prosecuted under other sections of
the Gun Control Act if he transferred any such firearm
outside his own state. 63 The argument also ignores the
lack of any prohibition against transporting the same fire-
arms across state lines with a private motor vehicle.
Williams involved a traveler who handed luggage con-
taining a legally possessed firearm to the pilot, who placed
-7 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) (1982) (emphasis added).
3-1 Id. (emphasis added).
.m, Burton, 351 F. Supp. at 1378. The court concluded that to fall within the
passenger exception provided in section 922(e), "actual delivery of the firearm
and ammunition to one of the designated persons must have been accomplished."
Id.
• ,w, The court suggested that an oral declaration may be unnecessary "where the
firearm is delivered over to the pilot in a gun case or other similar object under
circumstances where it is clear the recipient knows he is receiving a firearm." Id.
at 1378 n.3. One wonders if submitting a suitcase with a firearm for x-ray inspec-
tion would satisfy the requirement. See United States v. Brown, 508 F.2d 427, 432
(8th Cir. 1974) ("the act of a passenger presenting his hand luggage to responsi-
ble airline personnel for inspection suggests an intent to disclose rather than to
conceal those items within the bag which will come into view on ordinary
inspection").
.... 485 F.2d 1383 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 (1974).
3, 2 Id. at 1384-85.
-:, See 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(2), (3) (1982).
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the luggage in the nose cone of the plane. 64 Construing
the terms "deliver said firearm or ammunition into the
custody of the pilot," the court held that 'custody' must
be construed to mean a transfer of control in a manner
which gives the carrier actual notice of the presence of a
firearm. '3 65 Yet the bag and all of its contents were in the
physical possession of the pilot, regardless of whether or
not he knew the identity of those contents.366
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. One Heckler-Koch
R fle367 agreed that "section 922(e) was enacted in order
to inform the carrier of the character of the items it was
shipping, thus placing on it the duty to inquire into the
legality of the shipment. Thus, it is imperative that the
carrier be given actual notice of the character of the items
it is transporting. ' 368 The passenger in this case, however,
did declare the rifle to the airline baggage clerk.169 The
issue was whether or not this constituted delivery "into
the custody of the pilot, captain, conductor or operator"
of the carrier.3 7 0 The court held,
The purpose of the proviso is evidently to permit the law-
ful transportation of a passenger's firearm while insuring
that the weapon is placed under the control of the person
in charge of the trip. It would seem that a passenger who
transfers custody of a firearm to a responsible agent of the
carrier and who gives notice that it is in fact a firearm
which is being transferred would substantially comply with
the proviso. That conduct could reasonably be considered
constructive delivery into the custody of the pilot.... This
interpretation of the proviso also seems more reasonable
than that advanced by the government because the rather
- 485 F.2d at 1384.
"o5 Id. at 1385.
- It should be noted that section 922(e) clearly applies to the undeclared ship-
ment of firearms when the owner is not present. See, e.g., United States v. Smith,
542 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1976) (defendant convicted under section 922(a) and
other statutes for delivering a stolen machine gun to a bus for interstate transpor-
tation without written notice).
.17 629 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1980).
- Id. at 1254.
'(i Id.
470 Id.
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rigorous security measures in effect at many airports make
it unlikely that an airline passenger could personally de-
liver a firearm into the custody of the airline's pilot. We
cannot attribute to Congress the intent to specifically de-
clare certain conduct to be outside the penal provisions of
the Act with the knowledge that it is practically impossible
to engage in that conduct. To do so would render the pas-
senger proviso a nullity and be contrary to the practice of
the courts to construe criminal statutes in favor of the
defendant. 37'
By the same token, one should not attribute to Congress
an intent to make carrying an undeclared, loaded firearm
on one's person in flight a misdemeanor under the An-
tihijacking Act, 72 but shipping an undeclared, unloaded
gun in baggage a felony under the Gun Control Act.
Some argue that requiring the individual to declare the
firearm violates the right against self-incrimination. In
United States v. Wilson 373 defendant was convicted for hav-
ing another person transport four undeclared revolvers
and a rifle out of the country by airline, intending that
notice not be given to the carrier.37 Since the exporta-
tion was illegal, he argued that compelling him to admit
his guilt by giving notice of the crime to the carrier vio-
lated the fifth amendment. 7 5 Because the carrier had no
legal obligation to inform government authorities (a de-
batable proposition, since misprision of felony is itself a
felony376), the court held that a declaration does not cre-
ate a substantial hazard of self-incrimination:
For the common carrier is the only party to receive the
required notice, and it need not inform any government
officials to itself escape liability under the companion stat-
.,, Id. The court added, "We think it relatively clear, however, that the proviso
as a whole was only intended to provide a means by which persons who could
otherwise lawfully take their firearms across state lines could bring the firearms
with them when traveling by commercial carrier." Id. at 1255.
172 See supra text accompanying note 105.
37 - 721 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1983).
37- Id. at 973.
37.5 Id.
3 76 See 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
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ute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o, but can simply refuse to transport
the weapons. Indeed, the legislative history of § 922(e) in-
dicates that its primary purpose was not the apprehension
of illegal arms dealers; rather, it was designed to enable
common carriers to fulfill more effectively their own statu-
tory responsibilities under § 922(0. s 77
In United States v. Udofot 378 defendant checked baggage
containing a dozen revolvers, without declaration of the
contents, on an international flight.3 7 9 X-ray screening of
the bag revealed its contents. 380  Holding that section
922(e) does not require proof of specific intent, the
Eighth Circuit found that the section as applied to defend-
ant did not violate due process under the fifth amend-
ment.3 8 ' Defendant argued that he should be put on
notice of the required behavior and that the section was
void under Lambert v. California.3 2 The court found that
the passenger had actual notice because he had extensive
exposure to firearms regulations, "knew that carryon bag-
gage was screened for firearms," and "a bulletin was
posted at the ticket counter announcing in conspicuous
print and bold colors that firearms in checked baggage
must be declared and unloaded. 3183
The fifth amendment problem received attention again
in United States v. Flores. s4 Flores involved an attempt to fly
twenty-two revolvers to Ecuador in checked baggage. 8 5
s77 721 F.2d at 974 (footnote omitted).
_17 711 F.2d 831 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 896 (1983).
379 Id. at 834.
38o Id. at 840.
s,, Id. at 841.
382 355 U.S. 225 (1957). The Supreme Court in Lambert reversed the conviction
of a defendant charged with failing to register under a Los Angeles ordinance that
made it unlawful for a person with a past felony conviction to remain in the city
for more than five days without registering his or her presence. Id. at 225-26.
The Court based the decision squarely on constitutional due process principles,
noting that while ignorance of the law generally provides no excuse, the nature of
the ordinance in question was such that defendant could not be charged with con-
structive notice of her duty to register. See id. at 228-29.
383 Udofot, 711 F.2d at 841. However, the sign only indicated that failure to
declare subjected one "to a civil penalty of $1,000." Id. at n. 11.
384 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985).
385 Id. at 1500.
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A majority of the Ninth Circuit panel upheld the statute
because it is regulatory and the notice requirement is ad-
dressed to the public at large. 86 A strong dissent argued
that the statute has penal aspects that go beyond mere
regulation, and that the term 'knowingly' requires actual
notice and specific intent to violate the statute. 3 87
Fifth amendment questions also arose in United States v.
Alkhafaji, 88 in which a search based on a tip revealed
three shotguns and eight handguns in checked baggage
being shipped by a passenger on a flight to Iraq.3 8 9 The
Sixth Circuit in Alkhafaji recalled the United States
Supreme Court opinion in Haynes v. United States 3 90 which
held that the fifth amendment precluded prosecution for
failing to register a sawed-off shotgun for taxation pur-
poses. 391 The Court in Haynes based its decision on the
fact that the registration statute in that case was part of an
"area permeated with criminal statutes," rather than an
area concerned primarily with regulation. 92 The Alkhafaji
court noted, however, that most firearms are not so re-
stricted: "Since many people are permitted to own and
legally transport firearms, compliance by most people
with the notice requirement would reveal no criminal
activity. 3 9 3
In a concurring opinion, Judge Krupansky distin-
guished that part of section 922(e) involving written no-
tice, from the passenger exception portion of the statute.
He stated, "The Fourth Circuit's determination [in Wil-
son] that no Fifth Amendment infringement was present
under circumstances where the incriminating information
was mandated to be disclosed to a private party is con-
trary to every principle associated with the Fifth Amend-
386 Id. at 1502.
387 Id. at 1508-09.
754 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 642.
' 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
:" Id. at 99.
392 Id.
--", 754 F.2d at 646.
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ment's guarantee of the liberty to remain silent.13 9 4 He
saw the passenger exception as a different matter:
The second section of Section 922(e) addressed passen-
gers who travel with firearms which they "own or legally
possess." Such passengers are required to disclose and
deliver the firearm or firearms to the control of the carrier
for the duration of the flight; unlike the first section of
Section 922(e), no criminal association is made a predicate
of compliance. 395
Judicial construction of section 922(e) raises two issues
which need either reassessment by the courts or legisla-
tive correction. First, neither the language of nor the in-
tent behind the passenger exception would impose a
declaration requirement. The Congress which made it a
misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm on board an air-
craft would not make it a felony for the same passenger to
ship his firearm unloaded, in checked baggage. As a prac-
tical matter, FAA action regarding passengers found to be
transporting firearms not declared to be unloaded most
often takes the form of a simple letter explaining the
proper procedure.
Second, the argument that a declaration does not in-
volve self-incrimination clearly falters in those few states
which require special permits for mere possession of fire-
arms. For example, police now arrest several out-of-state
travelers each week at the Newark, New Jersey airport,
hub of People Express Airlines. A large sign at that air-
line's location states, "Declare all Weapons." When pas-
sengers comply with the instruction, the airline summons
the police to determine if the passenger has a New Jersey
permit, and an arrest generally ensues.3 9 6 Obviously, the
innovative boarding and check-in procedures spawned by
airline deregulation have impacted both the fourth and
fifth amendments. 0
194 Id. at 659.
3w,' Id. at 661.
mw See Scott, The President's Page, TRAP AND FIELD, Sept. 1984, at 62, 63.
"',7 Had the framers of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act, discussed infra
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C. The Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986
The Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986'98 repre-
sents a major liberalization and deregulation of the
prohibitions contained in the Gun Control Act of 1968.
According to the congressional findings of the new legis-
lation, the rights of citizens "to keep and bear arms under
the second amendment to the United States Constitution"
and "to security against illegal and unreasonable searches
and seizures under the fourth amendment" required cor-
rective amendments.3 99
The 1986 legislation contains major amendments which
affect the common carrier provisions of the 1968 Act.
Failure to declare to a common carrier a firearm that one
is shipping to another in interstate commerce in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) must now be "willful" before the
government can obtain a conviction.4 °0 Congress also
amended section 922(f) to require that the prosecution
prove that a common carrier "knowingly" transported a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(f).40 1 The last
Senate Judiciary Committee report concerning the
amendments explained the differences between "know-
ing" and "willful" as follows:
The Committee amendment specifies a "knowing" state of
mind with respect to offenses that involve the greatest
moral turpitude and danger from a justified law enforce-
ment standpoint....
The willful state of mind applies to all other offenses.
These were determined to be generally more regulatory in
notes 398-4 10 and accompanying text, been aware of the courts' misconstruction
of what was intended to be the passenger exception to the declaration require-
ment, it seems probable that section 922(e) would have been clarified. This writer
is authorized to state that former Congressman Howard Pollock, author of the
passenger exception, concurs with the analysis of the provision as set forth supra
notes 342-353 and accompanying text. Affidavit of Howard W. Pollock (Jan. 17,
1987) (on file with Stephen P. Halbrook).
--8 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 922-26A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (amending 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922-26 (1982)).
.- I Firearm Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1(b) (May 19, 1986).
4W See 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(a)(l)(D).
401 See id. at § 924(a)(l)(B).
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nature, and warranted a higher state of mind to avoid the
application of criminal penalties in inappropriate circum-
stances. These include purely recordkeeping offenses and
others which, from a legitimate law enforcement stand-
point, do not require less demanding state of mind
402requirements.
In a list of offenses requiring proof of a "willful" intent,
the report included section 922(e), which it described as
arranging common carrier transportation "to nonlicen-
sees without notice to carrier. 40 3
Clearly the Judiciary Committee understood the pas-
senger exception not to require notice to the carrier;
rather the prohibition was the shipment "to nonlicen-
sees" of firearms without declaration. Considering the
sweeping liberalizing amendments to the 1968 Act, it
seems fair to conclude that Congress intended to repudi-
ate the courts' construction of the passenger exception
discussed above.4 °4 An earlier Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee report stated that "willfully" was inserted in the pen-
alty clause to require the prosecution to prove intentional
violation of a known legal duty. The report stated,
The purpose is to require that penalties be imposed only
for willful violations-those intentionally undertaken in vi-
olation of a known legal duty .... Existing law for the
most part requires at best a general intent, so that even
inadvertent violations, and those made in the best of faith,
may be the subject of prosecution. Improper prosecutions
under such conditions-even, in one case, for acts which
the director of the enforcing agency had stated were com-
pletely legal-were documented in hearings before the
Committee, and in earlier hearings before its Subcommit-
tee on the Constitution and the Senate Committee on Ap-
propriations. This subsection is designed to guarantee
against such practices.4 °5
402 S. REP. No. 583, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1985).
-,, Id. at 21 n.46.
4,," See supra notes 354-397 and accompanying text.
405 S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1985). For the proposition that
willful violations involve "a known legal duty," the report cites Pomponio v.
United States, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) and United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346
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To show that a defendant arranged common carrier trans-
portation of firearms without notice to the carrier, the
prosecution will have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that, in the above language, the arrangement was "inten-
tionally undertaken in violation of a known legal duty. 40 6
In other words, a party sending a firearm to another party
would have to know the law as described in section
922(e). More importantly, it seems almost impossible that
in most instances the prosecution will succeed in proving
that a passenger who checked baggage containing a fire-
arm with a common carrier, without declaring the firearm,
did so intentionally and with knowledge of the strained
judicial interpretation that has emasculated the passenger
exception.
The Firearms Owners' Protection Act contains an addi-
tional provision liberalizing interstate transportation of
firearms by a passenger. Firearms that are unloaded and
(1973). See id. After the statement quoted in the text, the report continues as
follows:
It is moreover designed to provide enforcing agents, prosecutors
and courts with a clear delineation of the type of offenders against
whom the law is directed. It removes the tendency of statutes per-
mitting conviction for inadvertent violations to "ease the prosecu-
tor's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he
derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to cir-
cumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries." Morisette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
Id.
406 Id. But see H.R. REP. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1327, 1337. The House Judiciary Committee of-
fered the following comments concerning the willfulness standard in the Firearms
Owners' Protection Act:
Proponents of the willfulness standard argue that the offenses for
which the standard would apply are mere regulatory offenses, for
which a conscious and specific intent to violate the law should be
required. However, a person violating a city's vehicular speed limit
cannot successfully assert that he had not read the city ordinance
nor seen a posted speed limit.... The Committee believes that ... a
person who engages in the business of selling hand grenades or
machine guns should not escape prosecution solely on the grounds
that the government cannot produce witnesses to whom the defend-
ant admitted knowledge that such conduct requires a federal license,
and a determination to violate that law.
Id. These comments were offered in support of the Committee's bill, however,
which was voted down. See 132 CONG. REC. 1699 (1986).
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not readily accessible may be transported for lawful pur-
poses from and to any place where one lawfully may pos-
sess and carry such firearms, regardless of state law.40 7 As
a Senate Judiciary Committee report noted, this adds a
provision
nullifying state and local laws which have the effect of
prohibiting transportation of a firearm through such state
when the firearm is unloaded and not readily accessible.
This is intended to prevent such local laws, which may ban
or restrict firearm ownership, possession or transporta-
tion, from being used to harass interstate commerce and
travellers. It is anticipated that the firearms being trans-
ported will be made inaccessible in a way consistent with
the mode of transportation ....
This amendment is significant in that many arrests at air-
ports for firearms involve passengers seeking to transport
inaccessible firearms through states which prohibit mere
possession of firearms without a permit.4"9 Prosecutions
brought under state law for otherwise good faith and legal
conduct will be precluded.41 0
AFTERWORD: WILL THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SURVIVE
THE AGE OF PLASTIC PISTOLS?
Current technology in both firearms and x-ray screen-
407 18 U.S.C.S. § 926A.
408 S. REP. No. 476, supra note 405, at 25. Almost identical language appears in
S. REP. No. 583, supra note 402, at 27-28.
4- For example, of some ninety-nine passengers arrested and booked for fire-
arms in luggage at the Newark, NewJersey airport in 1983-84, none were charged
with the federal offense of carrying a concealed weapon about the person. Letter
from FAA to Stephen P. Halbrook (Feb. 1985). The Firearms Owners' Protection
Act of 1986 will preempt state laws which allow conviction of nonresident hunters
traveling through the state without notice or knowledge of the state's permit re-
quirements. See supra note 407 and accompanying text. For an example of a case
in which a state court held that nonresidents can be charged with violations of
local firearms permit requirements, even though the nonresidents may lack
knowledge or notice of the requirements, see State v. Hatch, 64 NJ. 179, 313
A.2d 797 (1973).
410 The People Express Airlines hub in Newark, New Jersey, contains signs
which state, "Declare all weapons." Travelers who comply are arrested or de-
tained, even though they are in transit to and from other states. See Scott, The
President's Page, TRAP & FIELD, Sept. 1984, at 62, 63.
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ing devices allows for the accommodation of three inter-
ests: weapons transport, fourth amendment privacy, and
aviation security. Most airlines still allow passengers to
check baggage before authorities screen carryon baggage
at the entrance to the sterile area. Further, FAA regula-
tions neither authorize nor require x-ray searches of
checked baggage for weapons. The only firearms which
could threaten air carrier security are detectable by x-ray
screening of carryon baggage and magnetometer screen-
ing of the passenger's person.
The recent advent of the plastic (or polymer) pistol,
which is undetectable by conventional x-ray or magne-
tometer, raises serious issues about the continued accom-
modation of the above interests. If a firearm can be
constructed out of non-metallic parts, one wonders if strip
searches will take the place of what is now a slight incon-
venience, and if remaining fourth amendment rights will
be sacrificed to all-intrusive procedures to deter hijack-
ings. This article's concluding remarks will address
whether the current delicate balance of interests fash-
ioned by Congress, the courts, and the FAA, can survive
the new technology.
In early 1986, Jack Anderson published an article in the
Washington Post entitled "Quaddafi Buying Austrian
Plastic Pistols." '' It described the Austrian Glock 17,
9mm pistol which features all plastic parts other than the
metal barrel, slide, and one spring. The article described
the pistol as "frighteningly easy to smuggle past airport
security," and alleged that it was being sold to the Libyan
dictator.4' 2 Legislators immediately introduced bills in
Congress to ban the manufacture, importation, and sale
of any firearm not readily detectable by the standard se-
curity equipment commonly used in airports.41 3 On May
15, 1986, the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judi-
41" Washington Post, Jan. 15, 1986, at F14, col. 2.
412 Id.
4,.1 See H.R. 4223, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 4194, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986).
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ciary Committee held hearings on the subject.41 4
Despite the fact that the Glock has an 83% metal mass,
Congressman Mario Biaggi argued that the pistol could
not be readily detected. Interestingly, he made an exam-
ple of a Glock that had not been detected on a People
Express Airlines flight.4"5 The Congressman failed to
point out that this example could be used just as easily to
show that screening of larger baggage intended to be
checked, by x-ray devices designed only for carryon bag-
gage, sometimes fails to detect a firearm.
The study of the Office of Technology Assessment
stated, "From our investigations it appears that the mater-
ials technology does exist to produce non-metallic fire-
arms whose only metal components may be small
springs. ' 41 6 In a stroke of luck for the fourth amendment,
an engineering firm announced the Model Z x-ray inspec-
tion system which detects metals as well as "less dense
materials such as plastic guns, plastic explosives, drugs
and agricultural products. 41 7 This would preclude the
need for burdensome and intrusive hand searches of car-
ryon luggage. Unfortunately, it does not solve the prob-
lem of firearms carried on the person through the
magnetometer. Alternatives to pat down or strip search
must be devised should plastic pistols become available.
Many firearms have been on the market for a long time
which use more plastic than the Glock 17, and these fire-
arms never have posed a security problem, according to
Phillip McGuire of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms.418 Billie H. Vincent, FAA Director of Civil Avia-
4 Hearings on H. R. 4194 and H.R. 4223 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House




417 American Science and Engineering, Inc., Micro-Dose Model Z X-Ray Inspec-
tion-System Product Description Brochure (1986).
4 Oral Testimony recorded by the author at Hearings, supra note 414. In a
private letter ruling by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, that agency
ruled the Glock 17 "suitable for importation into the United States as a sporting
purpose firearm." BATF, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7540 (Jan. 10, 1986).
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tion Security, testified that while technological progress
was being made in the development of better security sys-
tems, the Glock 17 can be detected readily by current x-
ray systems. 9 Mr. Vincent added that a true all-plastic
pistol was not expected for another two years.420 A new,
international technology cannot be effectively banned, ac-
cording to Dr. Edward C. Ezell, an Armed Forces curator
with the Smithsonian Institution; instead, emphasis
should be placed on interdiction of weapons to interna-
tional terrorists.4 2' James J. Baker of the National Rifle
Association argued that only x-ray operator error can ac-
count for the alleged non-detection of the Glock (which
contains nineteen ounces of steel), and that a subjective
detectability standard based on inferior operator perform-
ance would justify a ban on all firearms.4 22
Without question, an x-ray of a Glock pistol is fully de-
tectable.42 3 The firm which produced 90% of all airport
x-ray units used in the United States wrote of the Glock,
Even the plastic frame shows as clearly as a toy plastic
gun which, incidentally, is one of the most common items
identified by airport security personnel screening pack-
ages and briefcases on the airport x-ray machine.
The barrel and the ammunition clip will cause the metal
detector to alarm although the plastic frame, by itself, ob-
viously will not. However, the plastic frame is completely
harmless and, in fact, looks less like a pistol than a plastic
toy gun because it lacks a barrel. ... [I]t would be as diffi-
cult to pass a Glock 17 pistol through an x-ray security
checkpoint as it would be to pass any other real pistol
419 Oral Testimony of Mr. Billie Vincent recorded by the author at Hearings,
supra note 414. In a letter to Mr. Carl Walter of Glock, Inc., Mr. Vincent enclosed
photographs of the Glock 17 as seen in an x-ray device, and referred to the "mis-
information about the detectability of your fine weapon." Letter from Billie H.
Vincent, Director of Civil Aviation Security, United States Department of Trans-
portation, to Carl Walter of Glock, Inc. (Mar. 21, 1986).
420 Oral Testimony of Mr. Billie Vincent, supra note 419.
421 See Hearings, supra note 414.
422 Id.
41See Dickey, Glock 17 Pistol, Am. RIFLEMAN, May 1986, at 23.
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through the same checkpoint.424
The fact remains that an all-plastic pistol probably will
be developed in the future. To make it detectable, one
designer proposes an implant for the pistol, with a special
sensor at the screening checkpoint, rather than a device
that detects plastic. 42 5 It has been suggested that sensors
could be developed to detect pistols as far as fifty feet
away, that all new pistols (whether plastic or metal) should
have implants, and that police could use these sensors to
detect pistols on the streets as well as at airports.426
Ominous constitutional implications accompany such
proposals. Laws requiring that firearms be extraordina-
rily detectable and that citizens on the streets be scanned
for weapons without probable cause would violate both
the spirit and the letter of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments. Alternatively, the right to privacy and the right
against self-incrimination can be preserved without sacri-
ficing public safety in the airport screening context by use
of x-ray which keeps pace with firearms technology.42 7
While planning for hypothetical firearms and screening
devices may be warranted today, the fact remains that
magnetometers and x-ray devices currently cannot detect
small but powerful explosives with a satisfactory level of
efficiency. Further, unlike plastic pistols which do not ex-
ist, the present practice of employing poorly paid and
trained x-ray operators, coupled with inadequate back-
ground checks of airport employees with access to sterile
areas, poses real and immediate threats to air carrier se-
curity. Several factors should counsel reluctance to cur-
tail further the fourth amendment rights of air travelers
424 Letter from Astrophysics Research Corp. to Congressman Mario Biaggi
(Mar. 27, 1986).
42.- Lesmeister, World's First All-Plastic Pistol, 14 AM. FIREARMS INDUSTRY 36-
37 (1986).
4 See Molchan, Industry Insights, 14 AM. FIREARMS INDUSTRY 48 (1986).
4 2Whether the magnetometer similarly can keep pace and detect plastic pistols
on the person remains to be seen. The fourth amendment certainly would pre-
clude use of a device that would show an x-ray like profile of a person, right down
to their private parts and bones.
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and the rights of persons who transport firearms for law-
ful purposes. Current procedures literally have elimi-
nated any successful hijacking in the United States from
1973 to the present. Moreover, despite the awesome na-
ture of a hijacking, the fact remains that most hijacking
victims survive, particularly when the perpetrators employ
firearms rather than explosives. The threat and appropri-
ate responses should be kept in perspective with the real-
ity that most acts of violence occur in streets, homes, and
cities, where fourth amendment protections survive to va-
rying degrees.
The rights of passengers to transport firearms and to be
free of unreasonable searches and seizures currently en-
joy a delicate balance with the interests of passengers in
air carrier security. This balance will be upset if airlines
eliminate the opportunity to check baggage before search-
ing carryon baggage, a step one major airline already has
taken. Moreover, the fate of this balance appears uncer-
tain as new technologies in firearm components and
weapon screening devices develop. The preservation of
constitutional rights without compromising security in the
next century will require vigilance and austere legislative
craftsmanship.
